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INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
By James E. Pfander* and David R. Pekarek Krohn**
ABSTRACT

Although the nineteenth century’s final judgment rule no longer represents
an absolute barrier to interlocutory appellate review, scholars disagree about what
should take its place. Some favor a regime of discretionary interlocutory review,
with power conferred on appellate courts to select issues that warrant intervention.
Others reject discretionary review as a waste of appellate resources and call upon
the rule makers to identify specific categories of non-final orders that always
warrant review. While the Supreme Court’s collateral order doctrine bears some
similarity to this process of categorization, the Court may have called a halt to the
judicial recognition of new categories in its 2009 decision in Mohawk Industries,
Inc. v. Carpenter.
In this Article, we suggest a new approach to interlocutory review that
combines elements of discretion and categorization. We argue that the district
court should be empowered to certify a question for interlocutory review
(categorically) whenever the parties to the litigation so agree (in the exercise of
joint discretion). Drawing on the case-selection literature, we show that the
parties will often share a financial interest in interlocutory review where they
recognize that a decisive issue of law will survive any trial court disposition.
Where the costs of preparing the case for trial are substantial and the risks of
appellate invalidation significant, the parties have more to gain than lose through
appellate review. What’s more, the orders chosen by agreement of the parties
make good candidates for immediate appellate review. Agreed-upon review will
occur only as to issues that the parties regard as presenting close questions that the
jury cannot settle.
*
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INTRODUCTION

In the comparatively simple world of the nineteenth century, the final
judgment rule worked reasonably well as a means of regulating access to
appellate review.1 Much civil litigation involved two opposing parties and many
cases went to trial, usually before a jury.2 The final judgment rule deferred
1

The final judgment rule appeared in the Judiciary Act of 1789, both as a limitation on appellate
review in the federal system and as a limit on Supreme Court review of state court decisions. See
An Act to Establish Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 22, 25 (1789)
(allowing review of “final decrees and judgments” of the federal district courts and review by writ
of error of a “final judgment or decree” of the state courts). The Judiciary Act applied the final
judgment rule to both of the two most common modes of appellate review -- writ of error review
for judgments at common law and review by way of appeal for decrees in equity and admiralty.
On the origins of the writ of error and its limitation of the scope of review to legal errors apparent
on the face of the record of the lower court, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 136-38 (4th ed. 2002). The appeal, by contrast, brought the whole case before
the appellate court and did not limit the scope of review to issues of law. See id. at 138-41. See
generally Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932)
(tracing the origins and operation of the final judgment rule in the early republic); ROBERT L.
STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1989) (describing modern practice).
2

See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459, 462 Table 1 Civil Trials in U.S.
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appellate oversight until the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict3
(except in the rare cases that warranted supervisory review through mandamus or
other common law writs).4 Parties focused their efforts on winning at trial in the
district court and sought review only when errors appeared on the record.5 The
common law writ of error, the preferred vehicle for securing appellate review of
jury verdicts in the federal system, limited review to issues of law and preserved
the jury’s role in the determination of factual questions.6
Two centuries on, much has changed. Today, many questions that juries
once decided have been transformed into issues of law.7 Such legal questions no
District Courts at 10-Year Intervals, 1962–2002 (2004) (civil trials declined from 11.5% of
dispositions in 1962 to 1.8% of dispositions in 2002 and civil jury trials declined from 5.5% of
dispositions in 1962 to 1.2% in 2002).
3

For the current statement of the final judgment rule, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of
appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”); § 1295
(Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over final decisions arising under certain subject matter, including
patents, as well as final decisions of United States Claims Court)). See 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.02–04 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.).
4

For an overview of the origins of the supervisory writs, see James E. Pfander, JurisdictionStripping and the Supreme Court=s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1433
(2000). See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.06 (extraordinary writs available under
“extraordinary circumstances” to review pretrial orders).
5

See 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 39App.100 (at common law, writ of error reviewed only
questions of law appearing on the face of the record).
6

See id. (common law writ of error unable to review, absent legislation, even questions of fact
raised in bench trial).

7

See e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (defining patent
claim construction as a question of law); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (whether inference of conspiracy is reasonable based on
facts in antitrust action is question of law); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (question of
qualified immunity is a question of law). In the 1980’s, Martin Louis noted a similar concern with
the rise of decisions that combine questions of fact and law, or “ultimate facts.” Martin B. Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A
Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C. L. REV. 993, 1002 (1986). Professor Louis noted that some ultimate facts have been
denominated questions of law because they were “regarded as too sensitive or too important to be
entrusted to juries.” Id. at 1004. While Professor Louis considered the ability to reclassify
questions of fact into questions of law as “a sword that appellate judges wear but seldom actually
draw,” id. at 1028–29, it seems that they have now begun to wield it with greater frequency.

4
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longer disappear into the black box of jury deliberations; instead, they persistently
demand appellate review.8 In addition, modern litigation has grown a good deal
more complex and variegated; complaints identify more parties and more theories
of recovery, and often reach across borders to bring non-resident defendants
before the court.9 With this growth in the size and complexity of litigation,
modern procedural systems now provide managerial judges, extensive discovery,
and forms of motions practice that substantially define the contours of the claims
and the prospects for recovery.10 Rising settlement rates, either through
negotiation or alternative forms of dispute resolution, mean that fewer cases go to
trial today as a percentage of those filed in federal court.11

8

See Cybor Corp., v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“claim
construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal”); Bradley v. Brown,
42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994) (application of the Daubert framework subject to de novo review
in court of appeals). See also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges]
(“[A]ccording to the Federal Circuit, the district court claim constructions were wrong 28% of the
time.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 247 (2005) (reversal rate of claim construction is
getting worse).
9

See RICHARD L. MARCUS AND EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–7
(3d Ed. 1998) (discussing “The
Metamorphosis of Litigation”); Daniel J. Meador, A Perspective on Change in the Litigation
System, 49 ALA. L. REV. 7 (1997) (discussing developments in the litigation system that have
made litigation more complex); Mass Tort Working Group, Report on Mass Tort Litigation, 187
F.R.D. 293, 299 (1999) (“In the absence of reform, these problems are more likely to increase than
to abate. Many believe that only the subtle exercise of discretion by knowledgeable and creative
trial judges has protected the judicial process from more substantial problems resulting from mass
tort litigation.”).
10

See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 374 (1982) (describing a
growing judicial role in supervising case preparation and encouraging settlement); see also Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)
(discussing changes in the role of the judge since the 19th century); David F. Herr, Annotated
Manual for Complex Litigation, Introduction (4th ed. updated May 2009) (noting the increased
responsibilities placed on trial judges by, among other things, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996)).
11

See Galanter, supra 2, at 515 (rise in settlement one reason for decline in trials); Marc Galanter
and Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (noting the ways that parties are encouraged to settle); but see Gillian
K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Non-Trial Adjudications and
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition Of Federal Civil Cases 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 705, 711–12 (2004) (noting the possibility that settlement rate dropped between 1970 and
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With the growing influence of managerial judges, the transformation of
questions of fact into questions of law, and the rise of settlement, the final
judgment rule no longer provides an entirely satisfactory trigger for the exercise
of appellate oversight.12 While the requirement of a final order continues to
control the timing of the review of most actions for damages, pressure for
expanded interlocutory review has led to a variety of important changes.13 Thus,
Congress has expanded interlocutory review directly, by creating the certification
mechanism in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).14 Congress has also acted indirectly to
2000). See also Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (if offer of judgment
by defendant is rejected, plaintiff will be liable for some court costs if judgment is not more
favorable than unaccepted offer); Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers Of
Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561
(2008) (challenging the “universally accepted [view] that Rule 68 is meant to encourage
settlements . . . .”).
12

See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 83 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (while settlement reduces
dockets, it is problematic because, inter alia, “it renders subsequent judicial involvement
troublesome”). See Howard B. Eisenberg and Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review
of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999);
Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2001); Robert J.Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Craig Allen Nard,
Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357
(2001) (proposing that the Federal Circuit should “be more receptive to adjudicating interlocutory
orders arising from Markman hearings.”); Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975); Michael E. Solimine,
Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990);
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007).
13

See Paul D. Carrington, Towards a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 168–69 (1984) (proposing a statutory change similar to what was later
adopted as 28 U.S.C § 1292(e)); Redish, supra note 12, at 91–92 (arguing that the current
exceptions to the finality rule “do not adequately serve the interests of justice in many instances.”).
14

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.31. Section
1292(b) allows the district court to certify appeals to the Courts of Appeals when the “order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation . . . .” § 1292(b). The appellate court, however, has the discretion to
deny such appeals “for any reason, including docket congestion.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). Section 1292(b) suffers, therefore, from the issue of double discretion,
requiring the district court and appellate court to agree on the need for immediate review.
Appellate courts have been reluctant to take appeals under § 1292(b). See Nystrom v. TREX, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (declaring that review of claim construction orders under §
1292(b) will rarely be granted); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1438 (7th Cir.
1992) (recounting a colloquy between the district judge and the parties where the judge lamented
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authorize federal rule makers to craft new rules for expanded interlocutory
review.15 Federal rule makers, for their part, have accepted this new delegation of
authority with modest enthusiasm; amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure empower the appellate courts to conduct discretionary review of
class certification decisions.16

that he “can never get the Seventh Circuit to take an interlocutory appeal” under § 1292(b) or Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b) after trying “many, many times.”); Erin B. Kaheny, The nature of circuit court
gatekeeping decisions, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129, 149 (2010) (circuit law regarding threshold
gatekeeping appears to influence judges votes on threshold issues); Solimine, supra note 12, at
1201 (high refusal rate of courts of appeals to provide review “reflects a high level of reluctance to
utilize section 1292(b) appeals). Noting that review of orders certified under § 1292(b) is
“surprisingly low,” Timothy Glynn has suggested that § 1292(b) be amended to accept certified
appeals unless certification constituted abuse of discretion by the district court. See Glynn, supra
note 12, at 246, 259.
15

28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) (“The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for . . . .”). See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, §
203.34 (Section 1292(e) is constitutional because it allows rule makers to define “when appeals
may be taken, which is an issue apart from the [congressional] power to confer original
jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.”) (citing Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970,
973–974 (5th Cir. 2000)); Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short
Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 50 n. 28 (2005) (predicting that “[t]he
number of exceptions [to the final order rule] may well increase in the future” due to § 1292(e));
Laura J. Hines, Mirroring or Muscling: An Examination of State Class Action Appellate
Rulemaking, 58 KANSAS L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010) (1292(e) “laid foundation for the only
exercise of this new rulemaking authority thus far, Rule 23(f)); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing
Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2007) (noting that “[t]his rulemaking
authority has remained largely dormant . . . .”).
16

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). See also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.34; 7B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1802.2
(3d ed.). Rule 23(f) provides that the court of appeals “may permit” interlocutory review of an
order granting or denying class-action certification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). The courts of appeals
have, however, been reluctant to exercise this authority. See In re Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d
134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (imposing requirements for the interlocutory review of class-certification
rulings that “will rarely be met.”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note
on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 (2008) (empirical study that finds
that “it does not appear that the courts are accepting most [Rule 23(f)] petitions.”) The Second
Circuit’s response to Rule 23(f) shows the problem with allowing unfettered discretionary review
over a narrow area of concern. See Glynn, supra note 12, at 260 (discussing the problems with
discretionary review). Even as the rule makers expressed a desire for increased supervision over a
specific area of law, the courts of appeals hesitate to provide that supervision. For example, the
rule makers specifically distinguished 23(f) from certified appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in
that appeals under 23(f) do not need to involve a controlling question of unsettled law. Committee
Notes to 1998 Amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); see also Hines, supra note 15, at 1030–35
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The Supreme Court has played a role as well. The Court has broadened
the collateral order doctrine to allow interlocutory review of a variety of matters
that it has deemed both relatively important and relatively distinct from the
merits-based questions that normally come to appellate courts after a final
judgment.17 In addition, the Court has fashioned significant exceptions in
statutory provisions that would otherwise foreclose interlocutory review of certain
orders. For example, the Court has ruled that the flat ban on interlocutory review
of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not bar all such appellate review.18
As a result, the Court has frequently struggled in recent years to define access to
appellate review of remand orders.19

(summarizing history of 23(f)). The Second Circuit, however, restored such a requirement by
requiring either “(1) that the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation and there
has been a substantial showing that the district court's decision is questionable, or (2) that the
certification order implicates a legal question about which there is a compelling need for
immediate resolution.” Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d at 139.
17

While the collateral order doctrine provides for review that appears to be interlocutory in nature,
it “is not considered an exception to the final judgment rule, but rather a practical construction of
the rule.” 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 202.07 (citing Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994)), but see 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, at §
3911 (“The only finality required is that the district court have made its final determination of the
matter in question.”); id. at § 3524.6 (describing collateral order doctrine as allowing “appeal of
interlocutory issues under limited circumstances.”). The Court originally applied the collateral
order doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (finding decision
final because it “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”). The collateral order
doctrine has since been applied to orders denying claims of sovereign immunity, Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), and official immunity,
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (qualified official immunity from Bivens liability). The
Court has also embraced the collateral order doctrine as the proper vehicle for review of some
remand orders. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996). Recently,
however, the Court has begun applying the doctrine more narrowly. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S.
345 (2005) (doctrine does not apply to order denying motion to dismiss on judgment bar grounds);
Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U.S. at 867 (doctrine does not apply to order refusing to give effect
to settlement agreement). In the most recent case on the issue, the Court indicates that it is
unlikely to expand the collateral order doctrine further. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,
558 U.S. ___ (2009) (doctrine does not apply to disclosure order involving information protected
by the attorney-client privilege).
18

See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (Section 1447(d) only bars appellate
review of remands based on § 1447(c)).

19

Compare Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (barring appellate
review of remand order) with Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862 (2009)

8
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Noting the Court’s efforts to define its parameters, scholars have
suggested a variety of competing approaches to the proper scope of interlocutory
review.20 Taking a pragmatic approach to appellate review, Professor Martin
Redish argues that courts should weigh the likely costs of deferring review against
the benefits that immediate review can provide.21 Professor Redish rightly notes
that interlocutory appellate review can sometimes correct serious mistakes at the
trial level, and thus avoid the costs associated with an unnecessary trial.22 On the
other hand, interlocutory review can result in appellate oversight that fails to
address any serious errors and serves only to delay the ultimate resolution of the
claim. Redish suggests that the appellate courts exercise discretion in weighing
the costs and benefits associated with interlocutory review. Professor Ed Cooper,
among others, has also expressed some support for a regime of discretionary
review.23

(allowing appellate review of remand order). For an assessment of developments, see James E.
Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme
Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2010).
20

See supra note 12.

21

Redish, supra note 12.

22

Id. at 98. See also Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 156, 157 (1984) (“serious consequences” of postponing review of
trial court ruling include that “an error may so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal
and further proceedings[, which] may not only represent an expensive duplication of effort, but
may themselves be distorted beyond repair by the events of the first trial.”). The effects of delay
may, in fact, go beyond the particular dispute. See id. at 158 (noting that if an unreviewed
incorrect trial court ruling may be dissipated by further trial court proceedings and the “appellate
courts may be deprived of the opportunity to clarify and improve the law on matters that
repeatedly evade review.”).
23

Cooper, supra note 22. Professor Cooper would accord greater discretion to the courts as they
gain competence. He argues that without “mature” judicial institutions, especially at the district
court level, rules that provide for as-of-right interlocutory review may be necessary, even if those
rules are extremely complex. Id. at 159. But at some point these rules may become “so complex
and so shifting that they cannot be contained in any set of elaborate rules” and that we should
consider whether “our institutions have matured to the point at which discretion can be substituted
for some part of the rules.” Id. at 158. Professor Cooper also argues that the level of the court
exercising discretion should reflect the quality of the judiciary at each level. Id. at 159. If trial
judges show themselves to be “much like appellate judges in ability and temperament,” they might
view “appellate judges as a resource to be invoked whenever immediate review promises to
facilitate the speediest, most just, and most efficient disposition of litigation.” Id. Professor
Cooper’s view resembles Professor Redish’s in that both believe the goal should be to have simple
rules that provide for discretionary review. Robert Martineau has argued against expanding the
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Other scholars, by contrast, defend a categorical approach to interlocutory
review. Rather than relying on the exercise of case-by-case discretion, these
scholars argue that the system of interlocutory review should attempt to identify
specific orders that warrant review in every case.25 Orders falling within the
24

exceptions to the finality requirement by rule, and for wide-ranging discretion in the appellate
courts to accept or reject interlocutory appeals. Martineau, supra note 12. He specifically
endorsed the approach of the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Appellate Courts,
codified in Wisconsin. Id. at 776. The ABA approach has been also been supported by others as
the best approach to interlocutory review. See Eisenberg & Morrison, Discretionary Appellate
Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, supra note 12; John C. Nagel, Note:
Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44
DUKE L.J. 200 (1994). The ABA approach gives the appellate courts discretion to hear non-final
orders if the appeal will “(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further
proceedings in the litigation; (b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or (c)
Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.” ABA Standards Relating
to Appellate Courts (updated 1994). While the factors for interlocutory appeal are similar to §
1292(b), there are three important differences. First, they are disjunctive requirements, so that
interlocutory review can be granted if any individual factor is satisfied. Second, they include a
broad factor relating to irreparable harm. Third, they do not require the district court to certify the
appeal, placing all of the discretion in the hands of the appellate courts. The assignment of such
wide-ranging discretion to the courts of appeals, however, poses two problems. First, it does not
address the reluctance of appellate courts to provide interlocutory review. See supra note 14.
Second, decisions rejecting immediate review may not give future litigants enough clarification
about when interlocutory review will be allowed. See, e.g., K.W. v. Banas, 191 Wis.2d 354 (Wis.
App. 1995) (rejecting interlocutory review without explanation except that “the court concludes
that the petition does not meet the criteria for granting permissive appeal.”).
24

See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259 (recommending that the rule makers provide for interlocutory
review of “problem areas,” where the lack of interlocutory review (1) has left the law unclear or
underdeveloped, and (2) inflicts severe irreparable harm on one of the parties.). Paul Carrington
suggested a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, which had a three-fold approach to revising
interlocutory review that relies heavily on the categorical approach. Carrington, supra note 13, at
168–69. First, his proposed act would tighten the final judgment rule by making a final decision
one “set forth on a separate document, manifesting the intent of the district court that proceedings
in the case be thereby terminated save for the taxation of costs or enforcement proceedings, and
entered on the docket of the district court.” Id. Second, he proposed a statutory revision similar to
the eventually adopted § 1292(e) that would “make explicit that the rulemaking power does extend
to the specification of appealable interlocutory decisions . . . .” Id. Third, the act would explicitly
allow for interlocutory review where it was “essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be
effectively enforced on review after final decision.” Id. at 167. The purpose of this last revision
was to eliminate the “necessity for strained interpretations of finality . . . and . . .use of
extraordinary writs . . . as an alternative to appeal.” Id. at 168. Those supporting discretionary
review raise the concern that rule based interlocutory review will not provide the needed flexibility
in the courts of appeals to manage their own case load and that rules are likely to be either over- or
under-inclusive. See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 301.
25

See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259.
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scope of these previously defined categories would thus enjoy interlocutory
review as of right and would not require any extended case-by-case analysis at the
jurisdictional threshold.26 This categorical approach resembles the Supreme
Court’s collateral order doctrine, which provides as-of-right interlocutory review
over orders falling within the scope of the doctrine.27 The Court’s categorical
thinking comes through quite clearly in its decisions: it has reminded us that
collateral order analysis should focus not on “individualized jurisdictional”
issues28 but on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.”29 Scholars who
support the categorical approach often propose to rely on rule makers to identify
relatively discrete orders for which the costs and benefits favor immediate review.
For example, both Professor Paul Carrington, and the American Law Institute’s
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, would rely on the rule makers to identify
the categories of orders to which interlocutory review would apply.30 Similarly,
Professor Timothy Glynn has suggested that the rule makers should identify
“problem areas” and create rules to allow interlocutory review in those narrow
areas.31
Critics of the categorical approach have expressed deep skepticism about
the prospects for developing a set of criteria with which to identify proper
26

See Carrington, supra note 13, at 170 (the law treats ripeness and timeliness of appeals as
jurisdictional is “a fetish which serves no significant systematic interest.”); Glynn, supra note 12,
at 263 (proposing review of class certification orders that could only be dismissed under an abuse
of discretion standard)..
27

See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Because the orders under the collateral order
doctrine are treated as final, litigants receive review as a matter of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
See also Glynn, supra note 14 at 192–93 (discussing the collateral order doctrine).
28

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay et al., 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978).

29

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).

30

See Carrington, supra note 13; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT
465, 495 (2004) (recommending a revised 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) that would give rule makers
control over when to allow appellate review over remand orders). The commentary for the
proposed removal statute explains that the rule makers are in the best position to provide the
needed “flexibility” by not requiring statutory amendment. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION
PROJECT at 495. The American Law Institute project retains, however, a measure of discretionary
review for extraordinary cases. See id. at 465, 495 (precluding as-of-right review but leaving
appellate courts to use extraordinary writs to review remand orders “free of any putative
restriction”).
31

See Glynn, supra note 12 at 259–60.
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subjects for interlocutory review.32 Professors Eisenberg and Morrison doubt that
the rule makers can identify orders by category that will always warrant
interlocutory review.33 Experience with the collateral order doctrine tends to bear
out this contention; the recognition of a right to interlocutory review can attract
some relatively dubious appeals.34 Similarly, the Court’s approach to the
interlocutory review of remand orders can sometimes result in the review of
matters that many observers, including the Justices themselves, would not regard
as worthy candidates for appellate intervention.35 This skepticism about the
ability of rule makers to define deserving orders by category may tend to
encourage reliance on discretionary modes of review as a way to weed out routine
and undeserving appeals. Eisenberg and Morrison, and Professor Michael
Solimine, join in the call for review based on the exercise of discretion.36
Apart from questions about the proper balance between categorical rules
and discretionary standards, debates over interlocutory review feature widespread
disagreement about who should fashion and apply the rules. At various times,
Congress, courts, and the rule makers have all taken responsibility for crafting
rules of interlocutory review.37 The rules differ not only in their institutional
origins but also in the level of the court system that takes the lead in determining
the existence of appellate jurisdiction. In some cases, the district courts can
exercise discretionary control over appellate review, perhaps by entering a partial

32

See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 296–97 (expressing concern that criteria would be
both broad and vague). Professors Eisenberg and Morrison make the additional point that
appellate courts might construe jurisdictional grants narrowly, allowing, in effect, for discretionary
denial of the appeal. Id.

33

See id. at 295 (identifying areas of disagreement about when to allow interlocutory review).

34

Pfander, supra note 19, at ___ (noting the growth in appeals from remand orders).

35

See Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1869 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting that “something is wrong” when, as appears to be the case in the context of
remand orders under § 1447, review is permitted “in an instance where that decision is unlikely to
be wrong and where a wrong decision is unlikely to work serious harm” but forbidden “in an
instance where that decision may well be wrong and where a wrong decision could work
considerable harm.”).

36

37

See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12; Solimine, supra note 12.

See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text (congressional implementation of § 1292(b));
supra note 17 and accompanying text (judicial creation of collateral order doctrine); supra note 16
(interlocutory review of class certification created by rule makers).
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summary judgment under Rule 54 and finding no just cause for delay.38 In other
cases, discretionary review requires combined action at both the district and
circuit court levels; section 1292(b) certifications fall into this category.39 Finally,
some forms of interlocutory review, such as class action certification review40 and
mandamus review,41 require only that the appellate court agree to hear the
matter;42 district courts have no role to play in facilitating appellate review.

38

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing the district court, when it determines that there is no just
reason for delay, to enter “final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties,”
thereby triggering the opportunity for appellate review); 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23.
For an argument favoring discretionary review of orders compelling arbitration, see Pierre H.
Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders
Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365 (2002).

39

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (interlocutory order only appealable if district court finds that it
“order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation” and the court of appeals “in its discretion, permit[s]” the appeal.).
See also supra note 14 and accompanying text; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, Commentary to § 3.12 (1994 Ed.) (describing that § 1292(b)
requires “concurrent permission” of trial and appellate court). Michael Solimine argues for an
increased use of § 1292(b), especially in complex litigation such as mass torts. Solimine, supra
note 12. Professor Solimine views § 1292(b) as an underused safety valve of interlocutory review,
which the appellate courts have reserved for use in “big” cases. Id. at 1204. He believes that if
the statute were “shorn of the . . . requirement [that it only applies to ‘big, exceptional cases,’]” it
would provide for the needed flexibility without overly burdening the courts of appeals. Id. at
1168.
40

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or
denying class-action certification . . . .”). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.

41

See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions . . . .”). See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.01 (mandamus
is included within “all writs” and “is generally used to prevent district judges from exceeding their
authority . . .”); Sloan, supra note 15, at 57–59 (mandamus directs district court “to act in a
manner necessary to fulfill her duties . . . .”); Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An
Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 84–85 (1984) (hereinafter
Restatement) (describing the “supervisory” use of mandamus). Melissa Waters has argued for an
expanded use of mandamus to supervise district courts that act more like courts of equity when
dealing with mass torts. Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002). While Professor
Waters’ approach would allow greater discretionary oversight, it raises questions. First,
mandamus originated as a tool for correction of jurisdictional and procedural issues, and has been
thought less appropriate for a full consideration of the merits of a decision. Second, reliance on
mandamus does not take advantage of the strength of the district court in evaluating the need for
interlocutory review. See Glynn, supra note 12, at 263 (“[A] district court judge is in the best
position to determine whether an order is worthy of appellate review.”). Professor Waters nicely
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Recent developments at the Supreme Court suggest that the debate over
how to structure interlocutory review may be coming to a head. In Carlsbad
Technology v. HIF Bio, the Court approved yet another exception to section
1447(d)’s prohibition against review of remand orders.43 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Breyer posed sharp questions about the Court’s handling of the doctrine.44
In particular, Justice Breyer questioned rules that seemingly authorized review of
mundane problems yet foreclosed review of more serious issues.45 He ended his
opinion with a call for help from “experts.”46 Similarly, in Mohawk Industries,
the Court took an exceedingly narrow view of the propriety of fashioning new
judge-made rules of interlocutory review through the expansion of the collateral
order doctrine.47 The skeptical assessment in the majority opinion was echoed
and underscored in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which proclaimed a
captures the interesting connection between equity and interlocutory review, noting that the
finality rule did not historically apply to courts of equity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(interlocutory review available as a matter of right for orders regarding injunctions); Restatement,
at 82 (“the finality requirement was never well established in equity”); Bergeron supra note 38, at
1371–72.
42

Adam Steinman has argued that the All Writs Act allows not just for discretionary writs of
mandamus, but discretionary appeals as well. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1257–58. He
further suggests that interlocutory review under the All Writs Act would “situate all interlocutory
appeals on a more solid textual and doctrinal footing . . . .” Id. at 1295.

43

556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1862 (2009) (concluding that district court’s discretionary decision to
remand after declining supplemental jurisdiction is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and does not implicate the ban on review of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–
(d)).

44

556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1869 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e have held that § 1447 permits
review of a district court decision in an instance where that decision is unlikely to be wrong and
where a wrong decision is unlikely to work serious harm. And we have held that § 1447 forbids
review of a district court decision in an instance where that decision may well be wrong and where
a wrong decision could work considerable harm. Unless the circumstances I describe are unusual,
something is wrong. And the fact that we have read other exceptions in the statute's absolutesounding language suggests that such circumstances are not all that unusual.”).
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (stressing that
collateral order doctrine is an exception that should not “swallow the general rule” that there
should be a single appeal from a final judgment, and that “justification for immediate appeal must
therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation
concludes.”).
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more absolutist opposition to judge-made interlocutory review.48 Together, the
opinions suggest the emergence of a fairly strong preference for the development
of rules through the rule-making process.
In this article, we propose the adoption of a rule of interlocutory review
that combines features of discretion and categorization.49 In brief, we propose a
rule that would empower the parties, by consent, to request the district court to
certify a question for interlocutory review.50 If the district court approved the
joint request, the party contesting the district court’s order could appeal the
certified question without first having to secure leave from the appellate court.
Such a consensual trigger for interlocutory review would rely on the self-interest
of the parties to identify district court decisions that warrant immediate review.
The requirement that the district court certify the appeal will allow the district judge
to maintain some control of the litigation by rejecting potentially disruptive repetitive
review and screening out cases in which she feels the decision might be modified as the
51
proceedings continue. Not every district court order would attract the consent of

the parties, needless to say. Indeed, we will explore a variety of situations in
which the parties will predictably disagree about the wisdom of immediate
appellate review. But the parties do have obvious financial incentives to weigh
the costs of going to trial in light of the risk and expense associated with both preand post-trial appellate reversal. Self-interest would encourage the parties to
identify situations where expected trial costs are high, and where the risks of posttrial appellate court invalidation of the trial court’s interlocutory disposition are
significant. In such cases, both parties might well prefer appellate review sooner
rather than later. Instead of trying to specify these deserving orders in advance,
we propose to rely on the parties to cull them from the litigation process.

48

Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying the
collateral order doctrine, even to find that the order does not fall within it “needlessly perpetuates
a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit.”).
49

As explained below, we would recommend use of the rule-making process as the vehicle for
implementing our proposal because it offers the possibility of ongoing evaluation. See infra Part
III.

50

Such a rule would be authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which allows the creation of rule
“to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise
provided for . . . .”). In other words, we are not proposing that parties be allowed to consent to
finality, but instead to consent to the review of an interlocutory decision.

51

In addition, district court certification will ensure that “feigned cases” are weeded out. See infra
Part III.
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Our proposal, which has not previously appeared in the literature,52 would
allow the parties to evaluate the economics of their case in deciding whether to
agree to appellate review and would add something valuable to the modes of
interlocutory review now available. For starters, our proposal would operate as a
matter of right for orders that come within its terms, thus avoiding the expense
associated with litigation at the appellate court level over the existence of
appellate jurisdiction. In addition, our proposal would rely on the parties to
identify situations in which immediate review can cost-effectively advance the
resolution of the case. Happily, the parties’ incentives will often lead them to take
account of the same factors that would presumably inform an attempt on the part
of the rule makers to establish criteria for interlocutory review. But instead of a
rigid system of categories, with inevitable problems of over- and underinclusiveness, the system we envision would allow the parties to tailor the timing
of appellate review to suit their own situation. We do not view party autonomy as
a solution to every problem of appellate oversight and do not advocate its
adoption to the exclusion of other forms. But we do think it would add something
valuable to the tools of interlocutory review now available.
Our approach relies on two insights not currently reflected in the appellate
review literature. First, our approach hypothesizes that appellate review can
reduce the systemic costs of dispute resolution, even where the district court did
not make a clear error in resolving a potentially decisive legal issue. In
discussions of pragmatic review, scholars treat appellate review as cost-effective
in cases where the district court made a clear mistake that would require trial of a
case that should have been dismissed.53 But we suggest that even close cases may
52

Professor Carrington has argued that the parties be allowed to waive a defect in jurisdiction,
thus envisioning “appellate jurisdiction conferred by consent of the parties[.]” Carrington, supra
note 13, at 170. We would treat consent not simply as overcoming defects in other modes of
review but as providing an independent basis for interlocutory appellate review. Party agreement
does inform some applications for interlocutory review today. District courts are more likely to
certify questions when the parties agree that they meet the test in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). It is also
“not uncommon for the parties to file a joint or stipulated motion seeking a Rule 54(b) judgment”
that triggers immediate review. 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23. In addition, district
courts may work to facilitate review by manufacturing finality (as the appellate court recognized
in Nystrom v. TREX, 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) when the parties agree that such review
would advance the resolution of the case. For more on the manufactured finality doctrine, see
infra note 63. Finally, some settlement agreements contemplate appellate review and thus reflect
the parties’ agreement that such review will help resolve the case. See infra Part III.
53

See Redish at 13 (“For example, a trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment, or to deny
removal from a state court, may require the parties to expend substantial physical, financial and
emotional effort in the preparation and conduct of a trial which may later prove to have been
worthless.”). See also Cooper, supra note 22, at 157 (if an error is not immediately reviewed it
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benefit from interlocutory review; clarifying a potentially controlling legal
question can avoid trial costs no matter how the appellate court rules on the
merits. Our approach also draws on the insight that we can rely on the parties to
identify orders that meet the close-question test for interlocutory review. Party
control, and district court review, can thus identify a category of interlocutory
orders for which review makes sense.54 We would thus eliminate the common
requirement that the appellate court independently agree to hear the appeal.55 By
eliminating such threshold review, our proposal should further reduce the
systemic cost of dispute resolution.56
Despite its novelty, our suggested reliance on the parties to select orders
for interlocutory review fits comfortably with two bodies of literature. One body
of literature explores the factors that influence the way parties select cases for trial
and settle cases in the shadow of the law. Drawing on this literature, we think the
parties’ self-interest would lead them to identify orders with a substantial
probability of appellate reversal. The classic article by Priest and Klein shows
that the parties will tend to select cases for trial in which they perceive genuine
uncertainty as to the outcome.57 Weak cases will be weeded out and strong cases
may “so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal and further proceedings.”); Sloan,
supra note 15, at 53–54 (noting how immediate review of a controlling question of law under §
1292(b) can be efficient because “an error in the application of a controlling question of law
results in wasted resources.); Solimine, supra note 36, at 1169 (noting that interlocutory review
“can save cost and time by shortening, streamlining or terminating the litigation.”).
54

This addresses the concern raised regarding the categorical approach to interlocutory review that
“any [] criteria that could be devised [regarding interlocutory review] are, of necessity, both quite
broad and quite vague.” Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 297.

55

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra notes 14, 16.

56

For an example of the costs of discretionary gatekeeping by appellate courts, see In re
Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (conducting a detailed review of a class
certification decision only to find that it did not present issues pressing enough to warrant
discretionary review). See also supra note 14. As noted above, Professor Glynn has suggested an
amendment to § 1292(b) to require the courts of appeals to hear certified appeals absent abuse of
discretion by the district court. In some ways, our proposal is more modest, in that with most
§ 1292(b) appeals, one party opposes the certification. We are suggesting only that the courts of
appeals would be required to hear those appeals that neither party opposes and the district court
certifies as appropriate for immediate review.
57

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1984). See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH, L. REV. 319 (1991) (empirically
testing Priest and Klein’s selection hypothesis); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 213 (2007) (“Uncertainty begets the lawsuit.”).
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may well settle without any need for litigation.58 The same logic will, we believe,
lead the parties to select cases for interlocutory appellate review in which the
prospects for appellate reversal are significant. In other words, a model of party
autonomy will tend to identify precisely those orders that pose a significant threat
of appellate reversal and will most likely block resolution through settlement. A
second body of literature recognizes and explores the implications of the parties’
power to choose a forum for the resolution of their disputes.59 Courts today freely
enforce forum-selection clauses, whether they call for the resolution of the dispute
by the publicly-funded court system or by a privately-paid arbitral panel.60
Parties can exercise their choice of forum at any stage in the process, opting out of
the civil justice system either before or after the dispute arises.61 Indeed, recent
developments suggest that the parties can ask a private arbitration panel to

58

See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 19 (as parties’ likelihood of being wrong about outcome of
litigation goes down, likelihood of settlement increases).

59

See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
233 (2008); Okuma Kazutake, Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration:
Consolidation of Multiparty and Classwide Arbitration, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 189
(2003); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses
and the Privatization Of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forumselection clauses is a manifestation of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional
and related matters.”). In addition to forum selection and alternative dispute resolution, parties
also have the option of consenting to a jury or bench trial conducted by a magistrate judge. 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006). The importance of litigant autonomy grows out of the general individual
autonomy valued in democratic society. See Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 Cal. L. Rev.
1573, 1574 (2007) (“[L]itigant autonomy should be acknowledged as a logical outgrowth of the
nation's commitment to process-based liberal democratic thought, and therefore a foundational
element of procedural due process analysis.”).
60

See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding forum-selection clause
in fine print on back of cruise ticket); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (giving effect to arbitration agreement notwithstanding the fact that it would
result in piecemeal litigation). See also Solimine, supra note 12. For a discussion of how party
autonomy interacts with arbitration, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The
Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000)
(“[C]ourts have largely accepted the party autonomy model, willingly adapting their own
processes to meet the articulated needs of the litigants.”).
61

See Redish & Larsen, supra note 59, at 1573 (“[T]he individual litigant's autonomy in deciding
whether to pursue her claim and if so, how best to conduct that litigation” is “the theoretical
foundation of the procedural due process guarantee . . . .”).
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conduct the functional equivalent of appellate review of a judicial decision.62 The
growing familiarity with party autonomy in the choice of forum suggests that its
use to select cases for interlocutory review should not prove unduly disruptive or
controversial.
We present our argument for a party-based approach to interlocutory
review in four parts. Part II sets forth the basic elements of the argument. We
begin with the intuitive case for party-based review, offering a simple
hypothetical case to explain why the parties might agree on the need for appellate
intervention. We next formalize the model of party-based review, drawing on the
literature that has grown up around the selection of cases for trial. We find that
the model predicts that the parties will agree to interlocutory review in cases
where both parties anticipate relatively high costs associated with taking the case
to trial, relatively low costs of appellate intervention, and a relatively substantial
likelihood of appellate reversal. Appellate review of such orders makes sense to
the parties because the prospect of post-verdict or final judgment review threatens
to upset everything that has gone before. Party-based review makes systemic
sense because it applies to one identifiable set of orders likely to produce net
efficiencies for the system of litigation as a whole. Finally, we collect evidence to
support our claim that modern litigation often displays the features that will tend
to produce situations in which the parties (and the system) can profit from agreed
upon appellate review.
Part III of the article considers a variety of objections to our proposal. We
first consider objections based upon the policies underlying the final judgment
rule. We show that our proposal does not run afoul of the sensible policies of
avoiding unnecessary, fragmented, or repetitive review. We next consider an
objection based on the limits that the case-or-controversy requirements of Article
III impose on the power of appellate courts to hear feigned or contrived cases and
to issue advisory opinions. We show that, with the exception of appellate review
aimed at purchasing a favorable precedent, party-based review does not present an
62

See Controlling Legal Costs – Law Firms Consider Appellate Arbitration and Consultation, The
Metropolitan
Corporate
Counsel,
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=February&artYear=201
0&EntryNo=10605. See also Moffitt, supra note 59, at 475 (proposing customization of the
appellate experience). While Professor Moffitt argues for allowing litigants to agree to customize
the appellate process, the customization he envisions is more related to curtailing, and not
expanding appellate review. See id. at 477–78. The courts of appeals also provide mediation
programs that provide assistance to parties in settling as an alternative to appellate litigation. See
Gilbert J. Ginsburg, Essay: The Case for a Mediation Program in the Federal Circuit, 50 AM.
U.L. REV. 1379, 1382–87 (2001) (surveying various ADR programs of the courts of appeals).
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Article III problem. Parties to a genuine dispute can agree between themselves on
the need for a determination of their respective rights and obligations without
depriving the court of its power to issue a declaratory judgment; party agreement
on the need for judicial resolution does not mean that the dispute lacks the
genuineness needed to support the exercise of federal judicial power. Finally, we
address what we call the incidence problem: the concern that the proposal will
produce either too much or too little interlocutory review. For a variety of
reasons, we do not believe our proposal will give rise to unbridled interlocutory
review. While it’s possible that plaintiffs will prefer to take their cases to trial in
the face of a threat of appellate reversal, we explain why we doubt that plaintiffs
will act irrationally and how the parties can structure side-deals that facilitate
appellate review. Part IV briefly concludes.
II.

THE CASE FOR PARTY-BASED INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW

In this part, we set forth our case for a rule that would allow the parties to
agree to interlocutory appellate review. We begin with the most straightforward
claim: when one takes account of the prospects for settlement and the costs
associated with litigation at the district court level, the parties will often have a
common financial interest in agreeing to interlocutory review of controlling
questions of law. Early resolution of such controlling questions can obviate the
necessity for a trial, can provide important information to shape the way the case
proceeds to trial, and can eliminate the possibility of a post-trial appellate
invalidation of the judgment. One can generalize by saying that review makes
sense when the parties expect to gain more from legal clarification (and from
avoiding the costs associated with a flawed or unnecessary trial) than they expect
to expend in obtaining an appellate resolution. What’s more, the parties’ financial
incentives will lead them to agree to interlocutory review in precisely those
closely divided cases of legal uncertainty in which the systemic interest in the
low-cost resolution of disputes will argue in favor of interlocutory review. By
allowing the parties to identify cost-effective interlocutory review, our proposal
should improve the overall operation of the dispute resolution system.
We develop three separate arguments in favor of a party-driven approach
to interlocutory review. In the first section of this part, we offer a simple
hypothetical to illustrate the intuitive case for party autonomy. We then attempt
to formalize the intuitive case, drawing on the theoretical literature that has grown
up around the economics of settlement negotiations. After setting forth the
intuitive and theoretical cases for party autonomy, the third section develops
empirical support for the proposal. For starters, we explore a number of cases in
which it appears that something like party-based appellate review may already be

20

Pfander & Pekarek Krohn

occurring in the federal courts. Indeed, in the field of patent litigation and
elsewhere, federal courts have responded to the demand for interlocutory review
by acting to facilitate review through “manufactured finality” doctrines that can
be quite difficult to square with current law.63 In addition, we show that the
federal courts have transformed issues of fact into questions of law that require
judicial resolution. This trend toward shifting issues from jury to judge—or what
63

Manufactured finality involves the voluntary dismissal of “peripheral” claims in district court
after pre-trial resolution of the “central or core” claim, thus rendering the dismissal “dispositive,
final, and appealable.”. Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by "Manufacturing" A
Final Judgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 982
(1997). Though apparently straightforward, the manufactured finality doctrine has divided the
circuits over the use of a without-prejudice dismissal of the peripheral claims. See Doe v. U.S.,
513 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the split among circuits). The Second, Fifth, and
Eleventh circuits do not allow a without-prejudice dismissal to manufacture the needed finality.
See id. (citing Rabbi Jacob Joseph Sch. v. Province of Mendoza, 425 F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2005);
Marshall v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2004); State Treasurer v.
Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 11 (11th Cir. 1999)). The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal circuits do allow, at
least in some situations, a without-prejudice dismissal to create the necessary finality for
immediate review. See id. (citing James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir.
2002); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., 939 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1991); Hicks v. NLO,
Inc., 825 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987)). The Seventh Circuit focuses on whether the parties and
district court have “schemed to create jurisdiction over an essentially interlocutory appeal.” James
v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Kaufmann, 985
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing appeal); Horwitz v. Alloy Auto Co., 957 F.2d 1431 (7th Cir.
1992) (refusing appeal); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266
& n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (allowing appeal)). At the suggestion of Mark Levy, the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States has taken up the
manufactured finality issue. See Mark I. Levy, Manufactured Finality, National Law Journal
(May 5, 2008); Agenda Book for April 16-17, 2009 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, p. 19. While the manufactured finality doctrine is narrower than our proposal for
interlocutory appeal by agreement, Judge Carl Stewart believes it may be necessary to address the
issue that there are “cases in which everybody—the parties and the trial judge—wants to send a
case up to the court of appeals quickly.” Agenda Book for April 16-17, 2009 Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, p. 38 (draft minutes from January 12-13, 2009 Meeting
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Standing Committee). Professor Bergeron’s
proposal regarding orders compelling arbitration can also be seen as an implementation of the
manufactured finality doctrine through without-prejudice dismissal. See Bergeron, supra note 38
(proposing that a district court dismisses litigation simultaneously with ordering arbitration if it
feels that immediate review would be important). Professor Bergeron notes, however, that under
the Federal Arbitration Act there appears to be circuit uniformity regarding the finality of withoutprejudice dismissals after compelling arbitration. See id. at 1383. This is because a with-prejudice
dismissal might have the effect of preventing the parties from re-entering court to secure and
enforce a judgment on the arbitration award. See Interactive Flight Technologies, Inc. v. Swissair
Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal of district court was
only without-prejudice in the sense that it was not meant to preclude parties from enter judgment
after completing arbitration).
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we call judicialization—creates a growing demand for interlocutory review, as
parties seek the resolution of decisive questions by the appellate court—the only
institution that can settle the issue. Finally, we show that many fields of complex
litigation display the financial characteristics (expensive trial costs relative to the
costs of appellate review) that would tend to make party-based interlocutory
review viable.
A.

The Intuitive Case for Party Autonomy

To see the intuition behind our proposal, consider a garden variety motion
to dismiss an action on statute-of-limitations grounds.64 Under current law, the
district court’s rejection of such a threshold motion would constitute a non-final
order and would not be subject to immediate appellate review.65 Such an
application of the final judgment rule makes sense in most situations. Defendants
almost always prefer interlocutory review: a successful appeal might secure the
action’s dismissal and will often, in the meantime, delay the discovery and trial
phases of the litigation.66 The defendants’ predictable desire for delay means that
allowing routine or categorical review of such orders does not make sense;
defendants could seek review even in cases where the only goal was to delay and
where there was only the slightest prospect of appellate reversal. But despite the
general rule, interlocutory review may be appropriate in cases where the
defendant has a substantial prospect of success on appeal; interlocutory review
could sustain the limitations defense, thus obviating the need for further
64

The validity of a statute-of-limitations defense may turn on a preliminary question of law. See
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 629 (2007) (petitioner/plaintiff
argued that each paycheck she received based on previous discriminatory pay discrimination was a
fresh violation of equal employment laws for statute-of-limitations purposes); Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 743 (1980) (petitioner/plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that, although
state law would have foreclosed the case, the limitations clock was tolled by compliance with
federal rules).

65

See Parmar v. Jeetish Imports, Inc., 180 F.3d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “the denial of
a statute-of-limitations defense may effectively be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment” and
awarding sanctions based on defendant’s attempt to receive immediate review of motion to
dismiss based on the statute of limitations). See also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,
Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (rejecting the view that a limitations defense should be regarded as a
collateral order that would warrant interlocutory review); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 551
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (denial of motion to dismiss on
statute-of-limitations grounds would only be immediately reviewable if such a defense conferred
the right not to be sued.).

66

See Solimine, supra note 36, at 1168 (noting that the final judgment rule “discourages the delay
of trial proceedings and harassment of party opponents . . . .”).
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proceedings at the trial level. Even if the appellate court were to affirm the
rejection of the defense and remand for trial, the decision may clear the way for a
settlement that would have been difficult to reach so long as the limitations
defense remained unresolved. Especially when appellate review costs less than
the trials avoided or decisively re-shaped thereby (an assumption that often
holds),67 review of substantial defenses could make the system more efficient.
The trick lies in identifying the cases in which the defendant has a
sufficiently substantial claim to warrant interlocutory review, given the expected
costs of trial and appellate review. Our proposal would rely on the parties to
identify non-final orders for immediate review. It may not seem obvious at first
blush why plaintiffs would ever agree to such review, having overcome a motion
to dismiss at the district court level. But return to our hypothetical case and
consider a situation in which the plaintiff predicts that the trial, though expensive,
will result in a substantial plaintiff’s verdict that the defendant can attack, perhaps
successfully, with the limitations defense. If the plaintiff views the limitations
defense as substantial, the plaintiff might prefer to litigate that issue right away,
before incurring the expense necessary to prepare the case for trial. After all, the
plaintiff can predict that the defendant will renew the limitations defense on
appeal from any verdict. If the plaintiff succeeds in clarifying in advance of trial
that the limitations defense was properly rejected, the plaintiff will have removed
an important legal barrier to liability. Plaintiffs thus have an incentive to agree to
interlocutory review in precisely the cases where the threat of appellate reversal
looms relatively large and the costs of seeking interlocutory review seem low in
comparison to the cost of taking the case to trial. Indeed, in many cases like the
one involving the hypothetical limitations defense, the parties may agree to settle
67

The American Intellectual Property Law Association reports that for patent litigation suits with
between $1,000,000 and $25,000,000 at risk, the median cost of litigation is $1,500,000 through
the end of discovery, and $2,500,000 inclusive of everything, including trials and appeals. AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMY SURVEY 2009, at 29 (2009). Pre-trial
litigation costs, including discovery are, therefore, the majority of the costs in patent litigation
suits. Even if the $1,000,000 post-discovery expense is divided equally between trial and appeal,
an appeal would still only represent 20% of the total cost of litigation. See David L. Schwartz,
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study Of Claim Construction Reversal Rates In Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008) (noting that the low cost of appeal and the high overall
stakes in patent cases mean that most cases are appealed). See also SCOTT BARCLAY, AN
APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES 48–49 (1999) (discussing the cost/benefit
model for determining whether to appeal and the role of transaction costs—including “nominal”
appellate court fees and somewhat higher lawyer’s fees—in making that determination); Theodore
Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of AntiPlaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 659, 660 (2004) (appeal rates of judgments
resulting from trial are twice that of nontribal judgments).
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the case after the appellate court rules. Interlocutory review will thus facilitate
settlement in the shadow of a (newly clarified) law and avoid the cost of trial even
in cases where the appellate court affirms the district court’s rejection of the
defense and remands for further proceedings.
B.

The Formal Case for Party Autonomy

One can create a simple model to formalize the intuition underlying the
exemplary case just described. Suppose a personal injury claimant has a solid
case on liability; both the plaintiff and defendant predict that in 90% of cases with
similar facts, the jury will return a plaintiff’s verdict. Suppose further that both
sides reckon the likely jury verdict at a value of 100. Finally, suppose that both
sides will face trial costs of 10 to take the case to the jury. In such a simplified
world, we can sketch the likely settlement range. The plaintiff should accept any
amount above 80, representing the expected value of the verdict less the cost of
taking the case to trial (costs that the plaintiff will avoid by settling before trial)
[(.9 x 100) – 10 = 80]. The defendant should be willing to pay any amount less
than 100, representing the expected value of the verdict plus the defendant’s
expected cost of taking the case to trial [(.9 x 100) + 10 = 100]. Such a case
should settle between 80 and 100, a range scholars sometimes describe as the
zone of potential agreement (ZOPA).68

68

See Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A
Multidisciplanary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 249, 273
(2008) (discussing how valuation affects the ZOPA). Two general theoretical frameworks help
analyze the interaction of factors bearing on settlement. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 57, at
321. The first, sometimes referred to as the “expectations framework,” posits that parties have
independent expectations of the likelihood of success of a suit and the damages at issue. See
Priest & Klein, supra note 57; George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985). Under this framework, settlement occurs if the expected judgments of
each party are close enough to allow settlement. The theory assumes that the parties evaluate the
cost of trial differently in determining what would be an acceptable settlement. The plaintiff’s
minimum settlement demand subtracts the plaintiff’s litigation costs from the expected judgment.
The defendant’s maximum settlement offer, on the other hand, represents the expected judgment
plus the litigation costs. The second approach to determining when settlement is likely to occur
considers the strategic behavior of the parties during negotiation. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979); see also Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). In the strategic approach, the behavior of the
parties during negotiation can result in a failure to arrive at an agreement prior to trial,
notwithstanding the fact that their expectations would produce a ZOPA.
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The introduction of divergent views on a judicial question, such as the
admissibility of an expert’s testimony under Daubert,69 can complicate the
settlement calculus. Suppose, in the above case, that the claimant and defendant
have different views of the viability of the claim. The plaintiff believes he has a
90% chance of a verdict in his favor, while the defendant believes there is only a
60% chance of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. These divergent views reflect the
parties’ evaluation of the plaintiff’s medical expert. While the plaintiff believes
the expert will sway the jury, the defendant does not believe the testimony meets
the minimum threshold of reliability needed for admission of expert testimony.70
Unlike the situation where parties agree on the viability of a claim, the parties will
no longer be able to settle. The plaintiff should still accept any amount above 80,
since he still has the same belief in his success at trial. The defendant, however,
will be unwilling to pay more than 70 [(.6 x 100) + 10 = 70]. Because the lowest
amount the plaintiff will accept exceeds the highest amount the defendant will
offer, the parties confront a negative ZOPA and cannot reach a settlement.71
Imagine the litigation proceeds and the defendant moves to have the
medical expert disqualified. The judge, however, deals a blow to the defendant
by allowing the expert’s testimony. The plaintiff and defendant both now agree
that, if the ruling stands, the plaintiff has a 90% chance of succeeding at trial. If
there was no chance of appellate reversal of that decision, the parties could now
settle.72 Settlement, however, must still overcome the parties’ differing views of
the likelihood that the trial court’s ruling on the expert’s testimony will withstand
appellate review. Assume that the plaintiff assesses the likelihood of appellate
affirmance at 80%, whereas the defendant sees only a 50% chance the higher
court will uphold the ruling. To calculate the settlement prospects at this point,
we consider both the likelihood of a favorable jury verdict as well as the
likelihood of an order upholding that verdict on appeal. In addition, both sides
must take account of the costs of appeal (which we will assume to be 2). The
least the plaintiff should be willing to accept is now 60, which is the expected
69
70

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow [cite]
See infra notes 140–160 and accompanying text.

71

This is a typical situation where the parties are “mutually optimistic” about their chances of
success at trial, and can therefore not reach a settlement. See J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, &
Albert Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements 2 (Harvard John M. Olin
Discussion
Paper
No.
678,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676404.

72

In fact, motion practice in general appears to accelarate parties’ ability to settle. See Christina
L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement 20 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1649643.
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value of the verdict [.9 * 100 = 90] multiplied by the plaintiff’s belief that there is
an 80% chance the verdict will stand after appeal, less the expected trial costs and
appeal costs [(.8 * 90) – 10 – 2 = 60].73 On the other hand, while the defendant
evaluates the jury’s verdict at 90, the defendant will offer no more than 57 [(.5 *
90) + 10 + 2 = 57]. Again, no settlement is possible. 74
Assume that the case proceeds to trial, and the court allows the medical
expert to testify. Assume further that (as both sides predicted) the jury finds the
defendant liable and awards damages of 100. Even now, after a jury verdict, the
parties will be unable to forgo the appeal and settle.75 The differing assessments
of the likelihood of appellate court reversal continue to prevent settlement. The
plaintiff’s settlement floor will now be 78, the value of the jury’s verdict
multiplied by the plaintiff’s 80% expectation it will be upheld, less the costs of
73

To keep the model simple, we have assumed that a reversal of the ruling would necessitate the
reversal of any verdict for the plaintiff and would not occasion a new trial. If we take account of
the possibility of a second trial based on an appellate decision, we can see how interlocutory
review may encourage settlement and, therefore, why parties might consent to immediate review
in certain situations. As a party’s expectation of a remand by the appellate court for a new trial
goes up, so does her expected litigation costs, because she expects to pay for two trials instead of
one. Taking this into account could significantly enlarge an existing ZOPA (or create a ZOPA
where one had not existed previously), as it reduces the minimum amount a plaintiff would accept
and, at the same time, raises the amount the defendant would offer. Interlocutory review would be
especially helpful as the reversal and remand rate approaches 50%. As with expectations about
close cases generally, expectations about the outcome of appeal in cases of imperfect foresight are
more likely to be error prone. See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 14–15. Interlocutory review
in this situation would significantly lower the likelihood of a new trial by removing concerns
about reversal on the issue at hand.

74

Just as the mutual optimism of the parties about the chance for success at trial prevents
settlement, so does the mutual optimism abou the chance for success at the appellate level. See
Prescott et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2.

75

In general, analyses under the Priest and Klein framework do not separate out trial from appeal,
except to note that a case that is close enough to go to trial will also likely be close enough to be
appealed. See Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 51–52; Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, &
Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations From The Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to
the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 240 (1996) (empirical analysis of the
selection hypothesis in federal appellate cases). Priest & Klein also note that if the trial judge’s
views of the law are clearly at odds with those of the appellate court, the parties will “‘reverse’ the
trial judge privately” by taking that into account in deriving their expectations of a successful suit.
Priest & Klein, supra note 57, at 52. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 119 (1996) (noting that the observed increase in appeal rates may result
from growing legal uncertainty, making it more difficult for parties to “converge on the likely
outcome of an appeal.”).
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appeal [(.8 * 100) – 2 = 78]. 76 The defendant’s settlement ceiling will now be 52,
based on the defendant’s view that the appellate court will reverse in 50% of such
cases [(.5 * 100) + 2 = 52].
Now consider the settlement possibilities if, at the point where the district
court allowed the medical expert’s testimony, interlocutory review were available.
The interlocutory review would have the effect of reducing the uncertainty
inherent in the question of law, and parties’ predictions of success would
converge. If the appellate court rules in the plaintiff’s favor, upholding the trial
court’s decision, both sides will now agree that there is a 90% chance of success
at trial. This resembles the simple initial case, where both parties believe the
expected judgment is 90 [.9 *100 = 90] and there is a ZOPA between 80 and 100.
If the appellate court rules in the defendant’s favor, overruling the trial court and
rejecting the expert’s testimony, the plaintiff will likely reduce his estimate of
success at trial to match the defendant’s initial belief that there is a 60% chance of
success at trial. In this case, both sides will agree that the expected judgment is
now 60 [.6 * 100 = 60]. This will create a ZOPA between 50 [(.6 * 100) – 10 =
50] and 70 [(.6 * 100) + 10]. Knowing that securing a resolution from the
appellate court in either direction could open up a settlement window, the parties
might agree to interlocutory review.77 In fact, the availability of interlocutory
review by consent might encourage the parties to settle before the appeal for

76

The costs of trial are now sunk costs and are therefore not considered. In addition, the jury’s
actual judgment replaces both sides’ expected judgment.

77

Even in the situation where the ZOPA makes settlement possible without interlocutory review,
there may still be reason for parties to agree on immediate review. Professor Robert Rhee has
pointed out that “[c]ertainty obviates litigation, uncertainty begets dispute” and that that parties
may be willing to spend money to “hedge” against the concern that they are not valuing settlement
properly. Rhee, supra note 57, at 254. In other words, parties may consent to interlocutory
review simply to better determine the risk of trial, and to make sure they know they are properly
valuing settlement. Even if the parties’ initial estimates lead them to believe there is room for
negotiation, each may still be willing to spend the relatively small cost of an appeal to remove the
uncertainty and make sure they are not offering (or accepting) more (or less) than they should.
The sequential nature of appellate decision-making has been noted as a barrier to settlement. See
POSNER, supra note 75, at 120. Allowing parties to consent to interlocutory review could reverse
the standard sequence—appellate review of specific issue prior to full judgment by the district
court—and therefore remove, at least partially, that barrier. Professor Steven Shavell has also
proposed that allowing litigants the option for shaping their appellate experience—in his case by
allowing the choice between direct appeal and discretionary review—can reduce uncertainty, and
therefore promote settlement. Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal
Use of Discretionary Review versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 90 (2010).
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somewhere in the lower settlement range, with an additional 20 to be paid to the
plaintiff if the appellate court upholds the trial court ruling.78
Yet interlocutory review does not make sense in every case. If the parties’
views of the likelihood of success at trial are very different, regardless of the
outcome of the appeal, interlocutory appeal may not create a ZOPA. We can
illustrate that idea by modifying our example such that the allowance of the
expert’s testimony has little impact on the defendant’s view that there is only a
60% chance of success at trial. Then even if the ruling is upheld, the most the
defendant would offer is 70 [(.6 * 100) + 10 = 70], while the plaintiff would still
not settle for less than 80 [(.9 * 100) – 10 = 80]. The example illustrates the
intuitive notion that, where the parties’ assessment of the strength of the defense
varies widely, they’re unlikely to reach an agreement. For the same reason, the
parties have little reason to agree on interlocutory appellate review of the issue:
the plaintiff would tend to regard the defendant’s proposal for early review as
aimed at obfuscation and delay.
This simple model predicts that the parties’ ability to secure interlocutory
review to gain clarification of a legal question important to the litigation before
incurring the cost of preparing the case for trial will yield settlement prospects
that were otherwise unavailable. Interlocutory review may be especially
attractive in cases where the parties predict a relatively expensive trial that might
be negated or decisively re-shaped by appellate review. When the costs of appeal
are relatively low in relation to the costs of trial, and appellate resolution of a
legal question can shape (or re-shape) the trial, the parties will have incentives to
secure the appellate court’s view before they present the case to the jury. In the
next section, we contend that this basic intuition applies across a broad range of
legal questions. We show further that the number of legal questions affecting the
litigation has tended to grow over time; the assertion of greater judicial control
over the resolution of civil disputes has created a corresponding increase in the
demand for interlocutory oversight.
C.

The Empirical Case for Party Autonomy

Moving from the intuitive and theoretical world to the somewhat messier
world of the litigated case, we find evidence that the parties agree to seek early
answers to decisive legal questions and that courts sometimes struggle to provide
them. We focus on three situations that illustrate the way the parties and the
district courts work to procure legal clarification from the appellate courts and the
78

See infra note 188.
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somewhat inconsistent reception such efforts have received from the appellate
bench.
1.

Patent Litigation and Markman Hearings

Patent litigation displays many of the characteristics that produce joint
requests for early appellate intervention. Patent cases often feature substantial
claims for damages, expensive trial practice, and relatively inexpensive appellate
review.79 Patent litigation also produces controlling questions of fact and law,
such as the judicial “construction” of the patent “claim,” that can play a central
role in resolving claims of patent infringement and patent invalidity. At one time,
issues of patent claim construction were simply sent to the jury, along with the
claims of infringement and invalidity. The jury sorted out the scope of the
patent’s claims in the course of resolving the dispute and appellate review
followed in due course. All that changed in 1996, when the Supreme Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments that
claim construction issues should be treated as matters of law for the court (rather
than the jury) to resolve.80 Now district courts routinely conduct “Markman
hearings” at which the parties litigate claim construction issues in formats that
“run the gamut from mid-trial sidebar conferences that undergird relevance
rulings to virtual mini-trials extending over several days and generating extensive
evidentiary records.”81 The result of such hearings can effectively determine the
settlement value of the infringement claim.82
The patent infringement case, Nystrom v. TREX, Inc. illustrates how the
recognition of a judicial role in claim construction can shape the parties’ demand
for appellate oversight. The district court conducted a Markman hearing and
rendered a decision that was, as a practical matter, fatal to the plaintiff’s theory of
79

See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 243.

80

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (construing the patent claims
is a mixed question of law and fact for the court to resolve).

81

Herr, supra note 10, § 33.222 (quoting MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17,
21 (D. Mass. 1998)) (omission omitted).

82

See id., § 33.22 (“many patent cases are resolved once the claim construction is decided, either
through summary judgment or settlement . . .”). To determine if a patent has been infringed, the
tribunal must decide how broadly to construe the “claims” in the patent. A patent’s claims act as
the metes and bounds of the monopoly grant. See Kimberly A. Moore, District Court Judges,
supra note 8, at 5 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

Review by Party Agreement

29

infringement. Yet the decision did not satisfy the requirements for appellate
review under the final judgment rule. The court did not formally reject plaintiff’s
infringement claim and did not resolve the defendant’s counterclaim of patent
invalidity. Lacking a final judgment “which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”83 the parties (and the
district court) sought a mechanism with which to secure interlocutory review.84
After requesting suggestions from the parties about how to proceed, the
district court attempted to finalize its judgment by granting a partial summary
judgment as to certain of the infringement claims and entering a stay pending
appeal of the remaining allegations.85 The apparent goal of the district court’s
stay order was to put everything else on hold and trigger review of the Markman
decision.86 But the Federal Circuit refused to accept this mode of facilitating
review.87 The stay order did not resolve the case on the merits, the Federal
Circuit correctly observed, and thus did not operate as a final judgment.88 After
all, the district court could simply lift the stay when the case was decided at the
appellate level and the counterclaims would return to active litigation. Stays are
generally not final89 and dispositions that fail to resolve pending counterclaims
83

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

84

Apparently at the parties’ behest, the district court attempted to ripen the claim construction
order for appellate review by staying the other claims in litigation. See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc.
(Nystrom I), 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The litigation began with an action alleging that
TREX had infringed Nystrom’s patent on a particular kind of curved exterior wood flooring.
Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom III), 580 F.3d 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The curving of the
flooring was slight enough that it was still comfortable to walk on, but large enough to allow water
to drain and for the boards to be easily stacked. Id. TREX countered with allegations of patent
invalidity and non-infringement. Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1348.

85

Id. at 1349. While the district court had entered a partial summary judgment, it did not certify
the finality of that judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 1350.

88

Id. at 1351.

89

Cf. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) (stay order based on abstention
doctrine was appealable as “final decision” because it effectively put the litigants out of court.);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (stay order
appealable as “final decision” because only issue in federal forum was that which would be
resolved in state court, therefore ending litigation in federal forum).
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also fail the final judgment rule. To accept this mode of review, the Federal
Circuit noted, would represent a departure from settled precedent and the ban on
piecemeal litigation.90 The decision therefore might be considered as giving the
requirement for a final order a “technical construction.”91
The desire for appellate review was no doubt sharpened by the Federal
Circuit’s practice of closely evaluating claim construction decisions. Empirical
studies of the Federal Circuit suggest that the reversal rate on claim construction
questions approaches 40%.92 This compares with an appellate reversal rate in all
civil proceedings in the federal system that hovers at around 20%.93 While
accounts differ as to why the Federal Circuit so frequently reverses on claim
construction matters, one component may be that claim construction rulings,
including fact-based questions related to them, are reviewed de novo by the
Federal Circuit.94 Such a reversal rate could influence the parties’ willingness to
settle on the basis of a trial court’s claim construction decision. If we assume that
a party in the position of Nystrom has an infringement claim worth $10 million,95
and a 40% chance of overturning the district court’s claim construction decision,
and the prospect of substantial trial expenses, the incentives to seek immediate
review seem obvious. Even the defendant, TREX, might prefer immediate
appellate review, knowing that the case cannot settle so long as Nystrom views

90

Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1350.

91

See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (the requirement of finality
is to be given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).

92

See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 240 (Federal Circuit finds at least one wrongly construed term
in 38.8% of cases).

93

See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119,
150 (2002) (80% affirmance rate).
94

95

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Damages for patent infringement are those “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). The floor of “reasonable
royalty” damages means that the plaintiff may be able to recover a large damage award even if he
or she does not practice the invention to the same extent as the defendant (or at all). Although
Nystrom was a working carpenter, Nystrom III, 580 F.3d at 1282, and likely did not intend to
manufacture wood flooring on a large scale, if TREX was found to have infringed, Nystrom’s
damages would have been calculated on TREX’s production, not Nystrom’s. The court can
increase such damages “up to three times . . . .” Id.
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itself as owning a patent infringement claim that it values at $4 million.96 For
TREX, an appellate rejection of the plaintiff’s claim construction may provide a
cheaper way to end the litigation than trial on the issues remaining after the
district court’s disposition.
Despite the parties’ shared desire for immediate review of the Markman
ruling, existing law provides few good options. One can hardly characterize the
claim construction question as sufficiently divorced from the merits to bring the
collateral order doctrine into play. Nor can one find the elements of a denial of
injunctive relief in the decision (even though plaintiffs will occasionally include
requests for injunctive relief in their infringement complaint and even though an
adverse claim construction decision necessarily reduces the practical prospects for
securing such relief). Mandamus does not seem appropriate as a way to review
the merits of the claim construction order97 nor does it seem possible to
characterize the decision as a partial summary judgment of the kind that would
bring into play the district court’s power under Rule 54(b) to declare such a
judgment final for purposes of permitting execution and appellate review.98
Perhaps the most promising approach would be for the district court to certify,
under § 1292(b), that the decision involves a controlling question of law as to
which there may be grounds for disagreement and as to which appellate review
will speed the ultimate resolution of the dispute.99 In some ways, this seems
especially appropriate; claim construction requires the district court to answer an
unsettled question of law (as the claims at issue have not been previously
construed), and its resolution will clearly move the litigation forward
96

See supra Part II.B0.
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See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia 542 U.S. 367, 379 (2004) (Mandamus "is
a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes. The traditional use of
the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to
confine the court against which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction.") (internal quotation marks, internal citations, and internal modifications omitted).
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FED R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)
(absent other important reason for granting certification, claim appealed under 54(b) should be
separable from remaining claims in that appellate court would not have to decide the same issues
more than once even if there were subsequent appeals); Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Bruner,
259 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001) (highlighting importance of separability for 54(b)
certification).

99

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) authorizes such review for the regional circuits, and § 1292(c)(1)
authorizes review by the Federal Circuit of appeals authorized under §§1292(a)-(b) if it would
ordinarily have jurisdiction over the appeal. See supra note 14.
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significantly. The Federal Circuit, however, has discretion over whether or not to
permit such an appeal, and “[s]uch appeals are rarely granted.”100
Yet despite this lecture on the first principles of finality, the Federal
Circuit’s Nystrom opinion confirms the viability of an alternative mode of
procuring interlocutory review that appears functionally identical to the district
court’s approach. In the course of describing how the district court could have
taken steps to facilitate appellate review, the Nystrom court mentioned dismissal
of the invalidity counterclaims.101 But the surprising feature of the opinion was
its apparent suggestion that even a dismissal of the counterclaims without
prejudice would suffice to create the sort of finality needed to support appellate
review.102 What the appellate court appears to have contemplated was the
following process: after the claim construction decision cut the heart out of the
plaintiff’s infringement allegation, the district court would enter summary
judgment as to those allegations. Instead of staying the pending invalidity
counterclaims, the district court would instead dismiss them without prejudice.
Such an approach would dispose of all pending matters and, at least in the view of
the Federal Circuit, satisfy the final judgment rule. Indeed, following dismissal of
the appeal in Nystrom I, the parties returned to district court.103 The court entered
the suggested order, dismissing the counterclaims without prejudice, and the case
returned to the Federal Circuit for appellate review of the merits of the claim
construction issue and the associated grant of summary judgment.104 The Federal
Circuit in Nystrom II had no difficulty in concluding that the final judgment rule
was satisfied by the dismissal of the counterclaims.105
Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s approval of this approach to
appellate review, one can fairly ask if the without-prejudice dismissal of the
counterclaims differs in substance from the stay order that the court treated as
non-final in Nystrom I. After all, the without-prejudice designation assumes that
100

Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351.

101

Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1351.
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For a discussion of the circuit split regarding whether a without-prejudice dismissal provides
the finality necessary for immediate review, see supra note 63.
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See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom II), 424 F.3d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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the dismissal does not operate as an adjudication on the merits to which
preclusive effect will attach.106 That means that the counterclaims of invalidity
remain alive and subject to re-activation through the filing of claims or
counterclaims. In particular, if the plaintiff were successful on appeal in Nystrom
II in securing a reversal of the district court’s adverse claim construction decision
and the reinstatement of his infringement case, the defendants would apparently
be free to reinstate their invalidity counterclaims. As a practical matter, then, the
without-prejudice dismissal operates in much the same way as the stay order. The
counterclaims go into hibernation, pending the resolution of the appeal on claim
construction, but can return to active litigation depending on the outcome.
Indeed, the defendants would apparently be free to re-assert their claims of
invalidity even if the plaintiff failed to secure the reversal of the adverse claim
construction ruling.107
Despite its curious features, we think the Nystrom decision may
underscore the importance of party autonomy in determining when to make
available interlocutory review. Rather than its analysis of technical finality, we
think the key to the Nystrom decision lies in the fact that the district court and the
parties apparently agreed that it would ultimately advance the resolution of the
dispute if they could secure an appellate resolution of the claim construction issue
before taking the case to trial. Given the salience of claim construction, the
comparatively high cost of patent trials in relation to the cost of patent appeals,
and the Federal Circuit’s relatively high rate of appellate reversal, one can predict
that parties will often have trouble settling their disputes on the basis of a trial
court’s claim construction determination. Recognizing this, the district court
judge in Nystrom was attempting to work with the parties to resolve a matter he
considered important to the ongoing case, but the court of appeals refused to hear
the appeal. Our proposal would promote the district court judge's authority by
106

Cf. Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001)
(distinguishing between adjudication on the merits, to which preclusive effect attaches, and
without-prejudice dismissal). On the meaning of “on the merits,” see Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving
Cases “On The Merits”, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407 (2010).
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See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943) (counterclaim for declaratory judgment of
invalidity survives finding of non-infringement of the original claim). In addition, there would be
no issue of the claim of invalidity being time-barred. The main purpose of declaratory relief
regarding invalidity “is to allow [someone potentially liable for infringement] to know in advance
whether he may legally pursue a particular course of conduct.” Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d
585, 592 (D.C. Cir 1976). Therefore, the ability to get declaratory relief lasts as long as there is
the potential for infringement, generally until the patent expires. See Erie Technological Products,
Inc. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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allowing him to certify the parties’ request for interlocutory review on a matter
that would benefit from immediate appellate review.108
2.

Particularity to Facilitate Early Evaluation of Novel
Claims

Litigation over novel theories of liability may also produce situations in
which the parties jointly prefer an early appellate resolution of a question of law.
One can see the logic of a joint desire for appellate review reflected in the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. A & K.109 There, the plaintiff suffered
grievous personal injuries at the hands of armed robbers while he was waiting
outside the defendant’s warehouse to unload his truck.110 Illinois law clearly
imposed a duty on landowners to reasonably guard against known threats posed
by the unlawful conduct of third parties.111 But Illinois law had not previously
extended that duty to those, like the plaintiff, who were assaulted on a public
street adjacent to a private warehouse.112 The case thus turned on whether the
duty of the defendant extended to events taking place on public property over
which the defendant’s employees exercised a degree of control as part of their
warehouse operation.113 As matters developed, the district court granted a motion
to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, and the Seventh Circuit upheld
that decision on appeal.114 One puzzle arises from the question why the plaintiff
chose to set forth the nature of the truck’s relationship to the warehouse in such
detail, detail that virtually invited a motion to dismiss.115 The plaintiff might have
survived a round of motions’ practice (at least in those pre-Iqbal days) by simply
108

That district court judges might view appellate courts as a resource to resolve important issues
resembles Professor Cooper’s conception that trial judges might come rely on appellate courts in a
“mature” judicial system. See supra note 23.
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years” of using public thoroughfare as “an extension of the receiving dock area”).

Review by Party Agreement

35

alleging that the truck was parked on premises that the defendant used as a
warehouse. Why did the plaintiff choose to plead in detail?
One answer to the puzzle of detailed allegations may lie in the nature of
the legal issue that the case presented. To be sure, the parties might dispute the
factual question of what amount should be awarded as compensation to the
injured trucker. But those sorts of disputes often yield to effective settlement
negotiations, particularly after discovery has been taken of treating physicians and
other expert witnesses. As long as the legal issue remained open, however, the
case would predictably defy ready settlement. If the district court and the
defendants were right, and Illinois law recognized no duty, the case had no value
at all.116 If the plaintiff was right, by contrast, the verdict might well reach into
the millions of dollars; breach of duty and resulting injury seem perfectly
straightforward. Initially, one might suppose that the plaintiff would prefer to
plead generally with a hope of securing a nuisance settlement (even if the legal
claim were unavailing). But the plaintiff might have also preferred to secure an
early determination of the legal question, confident that the case would settle for a
substantial sum if the court recognized the existence of a duty. Such a desire for a
legal determination could explain the detailed allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint, allegations apparently framed to set the stage for an evaluation of the
legal issues. The plaintiff (or his lawyers) may have sought to defer their
investment in the discovery expenses needed to bring the case to trial until after
the appellate court upheld the viability of the legal theory.
Mitchell suggests that a more subtle factor might lend support to the
suggested model of agreed-upon appellate review. In a case like Mitchell, just as
in the case of Nystrom, the district court judge may well recognize that the parties
share an interest in securing interlocutory review at the appellate level. Under
current law, the desire to facilitate such review may exert subtle pressure on the
district court’s evaluation of the defendant’s motion to dismiss in a close case.
Dismissal not only removes the action from the court’s docket, it also provides a
final judgment suitable for appellate review by the court with essentially final
116

In such a case, the parties might agree to appellate review of a district court order denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss (despite the fact that the order would be considered a non-final
decree). Both parties have an incentive to economize on the costs of litigation. Plaintiffs may not
want to spend money to take a case to trial only to have the theory of liability overturned on
appeal; better to know the legal viability of the action at an earlier stage. Defendants, similarly,
might well prefer to settle the case and avoid the costs of litigation once the federal courts
determine that the claim has legal merit. With their shared interest in avoiding litigation costs that
might prove unnecessary either way the legal question comes out, both the parties and the federal
system might well benefit from interlocutory review. See supra, Part II.B.
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authority over the viability of a novel claim.117 Our suggested approach would
allow the parties (and district courts) to agree to appellate review, thus making it
clear that the district court need not dismiss in order to facilitate speedy appellate
resolution of the legal question. With the prospect of agreed-upon appellate
review, district courts might feel less inclined to ripen close cases through
dismissal, thereby removing a possible source of subtle bias in the district court’s
decisional process.
We believe that a desire to secure an appellate court evaluation of the
merits of a novel legal claim can help to explain a part of the otherwise puzzling
tendency of plaintiffs, in the pre-Twombly-Iqbal world, to set forth their claims
with greater particularity than the rules would have then required. Many
commentators have noted the puzzling persistence of fact-pleading in a setting
where the rules required only that the complaint notify the defendant of the nature
of the claim.118 Of course, Iqbal confirms that notice alone will no longer suffice;
the plaintiff must plead enough non-conclusory factual information to satisfy a
standard of plausibility.119 To the extent the plaintiff in Mitchell sought to hasten
a definitive legal ruling, the case allows us to see why particularity may have
made sense for plaintiffs even before the Supreme Court found a version of it
lurking in Rule 8. If the parties’ joint desire for legal clarification explains a part
of particularity phenomenon, it suggests that Twombly-Iqbal may not dramatically
117

Of course, a denial of a motion to dismiss would not appealable until the final judgment has
been entered. See Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. Telechem Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2010).
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See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749
(1998); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987
(2003); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation 28 (Federal Judicial Center 2010) (collecting quotes
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007)). See also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and The Regulation of
Court Access, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 873 (2009) (major impact of Twombly . . . is not so much what it
says about the pleading standard, but rather what it says about discovery costs and settlement
leverage as well as the ineffectiveness of case management more generally.”); Richard A. Epstein,
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alter the degree of particularity one can expect to find in the complaints of
plaintiffs bringing novel claims. Rather, as others have suggested, the new and
potentially disruptive feature of Twombly-Iqbal may be its introduction of a
plausibility standard that goes beyond notice and particularity to require nonconclusory allegations that tend to show some support for the claims.120
3.

Settlement Agreements that Provide for Appellate
Adjudication

Parties sometimes stipulate that their settlement of a dispute will depend in
part on the way an appellate court resolves an issue that arose in the course of
litigation. For example, in John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,121 the
defendants appealed from the denial of motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment. Prior to seeking interlocutory review, the parties had structured a
“high/low” settlement that involved: (1) an initial settlement payment of $10
million by the defendants; (2) an agreement to seek certification of interlocutory
review; and (3) a possible additional payment of up to $17.5 million depending on
the outcome of the appeal.122 Such an agreement helps to confirm that the parties
will sometimes agree that the settlement of a dispute can best be facilitated by the
appellate resolution of a legal issue on which the district court cannot decisively
rule. Such agreements also suggest that the parties’ calculation of settlement
ranges can depend on predictions about the likely outcome of appellate
litigation.123
High/low agreements have become an accepted feature of practice at the
trial level; such agreements typically provide that the amount of the settlement
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Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 823 (2010) (the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal “invent[ed] a new and foggy test for
the threshold stage of every lawsuit, [and therefore] have destabilized the entire system of civil
litigation.”); Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves In The
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facts’ language [from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),] with a new standard grounded in
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will depend on the jury’s resolution of the case.124 The example of Doe v. Abbott
Labs provides some evidence that these agreements now include appellate
contingencies as well. But the use of high/low agreements on appeal has proven
controversial; indeed, some appellate courts have refused to assert appellate
jurisdiction on the ground that a dispute framed by a high/low agreement does not
present a justiciable dispute.125 While we understand the appellate courts’
concern with the parties’ ability to purchase a judicial precedent, we view
appellate high/low agreements as essentially benign and deserving of
encouragement in most cases. (We explore the problems of justiciability in Part
III below.) Such agreements certainly confirm our intuitive and theoretical
perception that the parties consider the cost of appellate review and the likelihood
of appellate reversal when evaluating the wisdom of settling the case or taking it
to trial. As with the other evidence in this section, appellate high/low agreements
tend to confirm our claim that parties often share an interest in interlocutory
review and courts often, but not invariably, attempt to make such review available
to them.
4.

Judicialization:
Resolution

The Shift from Jury to Judicial

If a variety of real-world scenarios already display features of agreed-upon
appellate review, we think that the number of situations in which the parties (and
the system) can gain from party-based interlocutory review will likely continue to
124
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grow over time. This section documents a trend toward what we call
judicialization—the judicial transformation of fact questions (previously sent to
the jury) into issues of law for the judge to resolve. We saw one example in the
patent field, where the Supreme Court approved the switch to the judicial
resolution of issues of claim construction.126 Others examples of judicialization
abound, and with them have come new demands for interlocutory review.
Following judicialization, the resolution of important issues often occurs before
trial or on appeal rather than in connection with jury deliberations. Decisive
resolution of important issues in the pre-trial stage of litigation virtually invites an
application for interlocutory review. In addition, and more subtly, judicialization
almost invariably alters the degree of deference accorded the district court
decision by the appellate court. Rather than deferential review of a jury’s
resolution of disputed fact questions, judicialization creates issues of law on
which the appellate courts will provide the final word.127 We suspect the parties
will continue to seek readier access to decisive rulings on these issues of law from
appellate courts.
Qualified Immunity
The Court’s well-known decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald represents a
textbook case of judicialization.128 There, the Court altered the test for qualified
immunity in constitutional tort litigation, ending the fact-bound inquiry into the
official’s mental state and shifting to an assessment of whether the officer violated
“clearly established” legal norms.129 Under the old approach, disputes over
official immunity often necessitated a jury trial to resolve the subjective good
faith of the officer as a matter of fact. The Harlow Court shifted from a
subjective to an objective inquiry, transforming the issue of immunity into a
matter of law to facilitate summary judgment.130 This change in immunity law
126

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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worked a fundamental alteration in the litigation of constitutional torts. Shortly
after Harlow came down, the lower federal courts began to insist that the plaintiff
furnish allegations detailed enough to support a conclusion that the government
official violated clearly established norms.131 Eventually, the Court would
confirm this conclusion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, concluding that its plausibility
standard applied to all claims, including constitutional tort claims against high
government officials.132 One can see the conclusion of this transformative series
of decisions in the Court’s description of the issue in Iqbal: did the plaintiff plead
sufficient factual matter that, if taken as true, “states a claim that [government
officials] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights.”133 By
casting the burden of pleading on the plaintiff, the Court facilitated the use of the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to secure an early determination of the viability of the
plaintiff’s legal theory and the plausibility of the claim.
An interesting change in appellate practice accompanied Harlow’s
judicialization of the qualified immunity standard. In 1985, the Court ruled that
government officials could seek interlocutory appellate review of non-final
decisions rejecting motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.134
Although such orders were not technically final,135 the Court found in Mitchell v.
Forsyth that they satisfied the terms of the collateral order doctrine. 136 The
decision was, to say the least, something of a departure from established doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine applies when the district court conclusively resolves
an important issue, separate from the merits, and that cannot be effectively
131

See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (collecting examples of lower court decisions that
applied a heightened pleading standard to constitutional tort claims). In Siegert itself, the
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seeking to overcome qualified immunity. Id. at 232.
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133

Id. at 1943.

134

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

135

For the classic definition of technical finality, see Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945)
(defining technical finality as an order that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment).

136

472 U.S. 511 at 530 (1985) (extending government officers a right to interlocutory appellate
review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense).

Review by Party Agreement

41

reviewed after a final judgment.137 Decisions rejecting a qualified immunity
defense may well satisfy the conclusive and importance prongs of the analysis,
but they do not turn on questions separate from the merits and they do not evade
review. After all, following the Court’s refinement of qualified immunity law in
Harlow, the existence of the immunity depends almost entirely on the merits of the
plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Only claims to vindicate clearly established rights may
proceed to judgment. Immunity issues thus overlap with the merits to a substantial
degree. They also present questions of law that an appellate court can review after a final
judgment. The Court worked around these doctrinal rough patches by re-

conceptualizing qualified immunity for purposes of review in the federal system
as a right not to stand trial;138 so viewed, the right was portrayed as one that could
not be effectively vindicated without review of the immunity issue during the pretrial phase of the litigation.139
Mitchell’s provision for interlocutory review provides an interesting
window on our proposal. Resolution of the qualified immunity issue will play a
central role in the prospects for settlement. In such cases, especially where
anticipated trial costs are high, the plaintiff and the defendant might have a shared
interest in securing an early determination of the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s claim; we can thus imagine agreed-upon interlocutory review had the
Court not made such review available as of right for government officials. We
might also predict that the routine availability of interlocutory review will lead to
the assertion of some relatively frivolous appeals by government officials who
wish to delay the trial. One might see some evidence of the Court’s impatience
with such appeals in Johnson v. Jones, where the Court unanimously cut back on
the scope of collateral order review for relatively fact-bound qualified immunity
137

Id. at 546.
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issues.140 Finally, one might sensibly predict that the prospects for the settlement
of Bivens actions will improve sharply following a decision definitively rejecting
an officer’s immunity defense. A recent study suggests, in fact, that plaintiffs
secure a higher settlement rate in Bivens litigation than has been previously
supposed; 141 even Iqbal’s claims were reportedly settled after the plaintiff
amended his complaint on remand to satisfy the Court’s more demanding
pleading standard.142
Reliability of Expert Testimony
Two Supreme Court opinions shifted, at least partially, the responsibility
for determining the credibility of testimony from the jury to the judge. The 1993
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held that the district
court judge had a gatekeeping responsibility to determine whether scientific
testimony of expert witnesses was reliable and relevant enough to be put in front
of a jury.143 In doing so, the Court “recognize[d] that, in practice, a gatekeeping
role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the
jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.”144 In Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, decided in 1999, the Court expanded this gatekeeping role to
include not just scientific testimony, but also to any testimony requiring
“technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.145 Of course, the prerequisite for
140
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the Daubert/Kumho evaluation—does the testimony involve scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge—is itself necessarily a question for the judge.
Daubert and Kumho created a new pre-trial battleground where litigants attempt
to knock out each other’s experts, not through the traditional tools of crossexamination, but before they appear before a jury.146
As with other instances of judicialization, the Daubert test for expert
witnesses creates situations in which the parties might sensibly demand
interlocutory review, as the Seventh Circuit decision in Fuesting v. Zimmer
illustrates.147 In suing for personal injuries, the plaintiff (Fuesting) contended that
the manufacturer of his prosthetic knee (Zimmer)148 had defectively designed the
sterilization process of the implant.149 The key witness in support of Fuesting was
Dr. Pugh, an expert who testified that Zimmer’s faulty sterilization procedures
caused the implant to fail.150 Before trial, Zimmer attempted to have Dr. Pugh
excluded as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert.151 The district court denied the motion in limine and the trial then
began, resulting in a jury finding for Fuesting.152
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Daubert ruling of the district court.153
Conducting a de novo review of the district court’s determination, the court found
that the Daubert inquiry was inadequate because although Dr. Pugh had the
requisite credentials, his methodology did not have the necessary indicia of
146

See Sandra F. Gavin, Managerial Justice in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm,
234 F.R.D. 196, 197 (2006).
147

421 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2005) (Fuesting I); 2010 WL 271728 (7th Cir. 2010) (Fuesting III).
Like Nystrom, the case appeared more than once in the court of appeals. Id. Even prior to
Daubert, commentators noted that using tools such as ADR to resolve scientific issues might
facilitate settlement. See Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 193 (1991) (finding there may
be a role for judges obtaining agreement to innovate regarding ADR solutions to scientific issues).
148

Fuesting I, 421 F.3d at 530.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 532.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 537.
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reliability.154 The court therefore remanded for a new trial.155 At the second trial,
Fuesting put forth a new expert, Dr. Rose.156 This time, the district court
excluded the testimony of Dr. Rose.157 Without the testimony of Dr. Rose,
Fuesting was unable to show causation, and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.158 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that
Dr. Rose’s testimony was properly excluded and affirmed the decision of the
district court.159 Reflecting its perception that the admissibility of expert
testimony was now a matter for the court to resolve, the Seventh Circuit
conducted its own independent analysis of whether Dr. Rose’s testimony met the
Daubert test.160
The Seventh Circuit’s handling of Fuesting nicely illustrates the way
judicialization can increase the demand for interlocutory review. Like the novel
legal theory in Mitchell v. A & K, novel expert theories of causation may be
decisive in complex products liability and medical malpractice cases. If the case
goes to the jury, acceptance of the expert’s testimony provides a sound basis for
liability. If Daubert forecloses admission of the expert’s testimony, by contrast,
and no other expert can be identified, then the plaintiff cannot get to the jury.
Immediate review of the initial (non-final) decision to allow Dr. Pugh to testify
could have saved the parties the cost of an expensive trial and could have
highlighted the need for the plaintiff to identify another expert. Depending on the
prospects for locating an expert to fill Dr. Pugh’s shoes, the parties might have
consented to such interlocutory review, knowing that the Daubert issue would
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Id. at 535.
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The court initially remanded with instructions to direct a verdict for the defendant. Id. at 537–
38. On rehearing, the court vacated the part of the opinion directing the district court to enter
judgment for the defendant, finding that the proper remedy, based on Unitherm Food Systems,
Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), was to grant a new trial. Fuesting v. Zimmer,
Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) (Fuesting II).
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Fuesting III, 2010 WL 271728 at *2.

157

Id.

158

Id.
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Id. at *5.
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Id. at *3–4.
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remain a threat to any plaintiff’s jury verdict.161 We cannot say that the parties
would have agreed to such review in this case, given our uncertainty about the
parties’ actual valuations of the case and their perception of the likelihood of
appellate reversal. But we can easily imagine that Daubert issues, like those in
Fuesting, could give rise to situations in which agreed upon appellate review
would make sense to both parties.
Other examples of judicialization abound. We can see evidence of similar
trends in such far-flung fields of law as antitrust law,162 patent litigation,163 and
elsewhere.164 Even where the federal courts have made no change in the balance
161

Of course, one might argue that interlocutory review could present problems of piecemeal
review to the extent it allowed the plaintiff to put forth a succession of witnesses (or
methodologies) until it found one the appellate court would accept. For a variety of reasons, we
do not envision a problem of serial appeals. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has any
incentive to lead with weak witnesses; rather, they will tend to offer their strongest witness first.
(To the extent that a party has several equally strong witnesses, they will often present them as a
group, thus enabling the district court to evaluate all the witnesses in a single proceeding.) That
may well have been the case in Fuesting; the plaintiff apparently hoped that Dr. Pugh, alone, could
carry the plaintiff’s burden on causation and only proffered the testimony of Dr. Rose after Pugh
was rejected. In any case, the parade-of-witness problem arises only if the plaintiff perceives the
defendant’s challenge to any particular witness as posing a serious risk of appellate reversal. As
with other examples of agreed-upon appellate review, such review of Daubert issues will likely
target those that most clearly warrant review. In any case, the requirement that both the parties
and the district court agree should limit the ability of one party (or even both parties) to game the
system.
162

Because antitrust law limits what inferences can be drawn from ambiguous evidence, the
determination of summary judgment motions can be very fact bound. The judge must, therefore,
compare the reasonableness of the alleged conduct to that of independent action by the defendants.
See Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(requiring the Court, in determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact “to
consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementation.”).

163

While it is not yet clear, the Supreme Court’s holding in KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., may be
an indication that the question of obviousness, including perhaps the factual underpinnings, is one
for the judge, and not the jury. See 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (reiterating that “[t]he ultimate
judgment of obviousness is a legal determination”); see also Meng Ouyang, Note: The Procedural
Impact of KSR on Patent Litigation, 6 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 158, 159–62 (2009) (citing John F.
Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary,
106
MICH.
L.
REV.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
34,
37
(2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/duffy.pdf as believing that KSR
moved the question of obviousness from a jury to a judge question, and Judge Matthew Kennelly
as believing that it had not).
164

For example, the Seventh Circuit found that because the controlling Illinois state law treated
the question of piercing the corporate veil as one of equity, it was to be determined by a judge and
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between judge and jury, the growth of federal statutory law has tended to provide
a more detailed legal framework within which fact-finders must operate in
resolving issues of federal liability.165 With the growth of statutes and the legal
questions they inevitably pose comes a corresponding demand for appellate
review, as parties seek the answers from the only body that can finally resolve the
issue. Our proposal attempts to address this demand for review by empowering
the parties and the district court to make it available when they all agree that it
would help resolve the case.
III.

PREDICTABLE CONCERNS WITH PARTY-DRIVEN APPELLATE REVIEW

Despite our perception that both the parties and the system have much to
gain from agreed-upon interlocutory review, we can imagine objections to making
such review more readily available. We address those objections in this part of
the article. We first tackle a set of concerns that may attend any proposed
expansion of interlocutory review, concerns driven by the policies underlying the
final judgment rule. We next consider the justiciability concerns that might
appear to arise from the fact that both parties have agreed to seek review. We
show that the fact of agreement alone does not create a feigned case problem
under Article III. Finally, we consider two possible concerns that might arise
from what we will call the likely incidence of such agreed-upon review. Some
may oppose the proposal on the ground that it will burden the appellate courts
with too many cases; others on the ground that the proposal has no practical value
because the parties will too rarely agree to interlocutory review. We say to both
groups: let’s give the proposal a trial run and see what happens. The possible
need for ongoing evaluation suggests that there might be an advantage in adopting
the proposed rule through the rules advisory process. The Judicial Conference
Committee on Civil Rules—or the newly formed joint Civil/Appellate
Subcommittee166—can provide ongoing review and oversight of new rules of
interlocutory review, adjusting course in light of experience.
not a jury. See International Financial Services Corp. v. Chromas Technologies Canada, Inc., 356
F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2004).
165

On the rise of statutes, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1
(1982) (describing an “orgy” of statute making and a resulting “statutorification” of American
law); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994).
166

See Report of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, May 9, 2009, at 7 (noting formation of
the subcommittee, and including on its list of topics to consider the manufactured finality
doctrine).
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A. Erosion of the Final Judgment Rule
One can question our suggested reliance on party agreement to identify
issues for interlocutory review on the familiar basis that it would undermine the
final judgment rule. Although this argument applies to any proposed expansion
of interlocutory review, it deserves serious consideration. In evaluating the
possible concern with erosion, we note that scholars have long taken the view that
the final judgment rule should operate less as an absolute prohibition and more as
a presumptive guidepost. Thus, a leading casebook explains that the goal has
been to “identify those trial rulings that should be eligible for an immediate
appeal rather than have their appeal postponed until a final judgment disposes of
the entire dispute.”167 In this section, we will briefly sketch the elements of the
final judgment rule and explain why our proposal will yield appeals that do not
offend the rule.
The classic justifications for the final judgment rule have been to avoid the
premature, fragmentary, and repetitive appeal of matters first resolved at the trial
court level.168 If we break down these elements, we can see a number of
considerations at work. As for the concern with prematurity, appellate courts
rightly expect that some appeals might be avoided or obviated if the final
judgment rule were applied.169 Thus, to return to our example of the non-final
district court rejection of a proffered statute of limitations defense, some
defendants might win on the merits at trial, thus avoiding liability and obviating
the need for appellate resolution of the limitations issue. As for the concern with
fragmentation, appellate courts often feel that they can better address the
fundamental issues in a case if they see the issues against the backdrop of a full
167

DANIEL J. MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS
UNITED STATES 49 (2d ed. 2006).
168

169

IN THE

See id. at 49.

The possibility that an issue might be obviated by further proceedings at the trial court level has
played a somewhat inconsistent role in Supreme Court decisions cutting back on the final
judgment rule. Compare Radio Station WOW, Inc. et al. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945)
(allowing review of a non-final state court decision on the ground that further proceedings could
not obviate the federal question) with North Dakota State Board v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156, 163–64 (1973) (emphasizing that further proceedings might obviate the federal question
as a factor supporting a finding of finality) and Construction Laborers’ Union v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542, 549–551 (1963) (noting that the union might, in theory, prevail in a state court trial but
concluding that this prospect of obviation should not prevent immediate review of the state court’s
rejection of the union’s claim that federal labor law foreclosed state court authority to adjudicate a
labor disputes).

48

Pfander & Pekarek Krohn

record; fragmentary appeals may not bring into view all of the issues that might
properly influence an appellate decision.170 As for the concern with repetition,
appellate courts rightly resist interlocutory review of issues that could return to
the appellate docket later in the form of an appeal from a final judgment.171 The
Supreme Court’s decision to curtail interlocutory review of fact-bound issues of
qualified immunity was based in good measure on concerns with the prospect of
repetitive review.172
We do not believe that agreed-upon interlocutory review will offend these
elemental features of the final judgment rule. Consider first the problem of
obviation. One can certainly imagine situations in which defendants will succeed
at trial, thus obviating any need for appellate resolution of legal defenses to
liability. But such defense verdicts on liability will likely occur in situations in
which both parties view the case on liability as something of a toss-up. In such
cases, the prospect of interlocutory appellate review does not create prospects for
settlement where they did not .previously exist; indeed, interlocutory review may
reduce the expected settlement value of the case from the plaintiff’s
perspective.173 This comports with our intuition that plaintiffs in doubtful cases
170

For examples of the somewhat formulaic invocation of the importance of a full record, see In re
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Without a full record and without the
benefit of an adversarial proceeding, the appellate court would be in a particularly poor position to
pass on the propriety of the district court's exercise of discretion.”); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d
1363, 1372 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Even though the district court decided the matter on a motion for
summary judgment, we cannot say that the development of a full factual record at a trial on the
action on the notes might not be of assistance to us in deciding the issues raised on this appeal.”).
171

The Court’s collateral order doctrine was framed with this problem in mind. Thus, in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), the Court emphasized that the
question at issue—the plaintiff’s obligation under state law to post a bond before pursuing a
shareholder’s derivative action—was separate from the merits and could not be effectively
reviewed after the entry of judgment at trial. The requirement that collateral orders must remain
separate from the merits and evade review after final judgment has remained part of the doctrine.
See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (denial of motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens was not sufficiently separate from the merits to warrant
immediate review under collateral order doctrine).
172

See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1995) (refusing to allow collateral order review of
a district court decision denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds; reasoning that the fact-bound nature of the summary judgment motion would
mean that the same issue and facts could well arise in the wake of a final judgment).
173

In Part II.B, we considered the settlement prospects in a case where the plaintiff and defendant
both assessed the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at 90% if a pre-trial ruling stood, but assigned
different values (80% and 50% respectively) to whether the ruling would be upheld on appeal.
Under those assumptions, we found that the parties would likely agree to interlocutory review to
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on liability will tend to press forward to a jury verdict in an effort to secure a
settlement offer from risk averse defendants who might agree to settle to cap their
potential liability and reduce the threat of a runaway jury. Thus, both our
intuition and our simple model predict that the parties would be unlikely to agree
to interlocutory appellate review when they anticipate a strong likelihood of a
defense verdict that would obviate the need for appellate review.
Just as we do not anticipate that the parties will agree to interlocutory
review when the case affords a realistic prospect that further proceedings will
obviate the need for review, we do not view fragmentation and repetition as likely
stumbling blocks to our proposal. Parties will tend to agree on the need for
interlocutory review only where the case turns on a relatively clear-cut issue on
which the appellate court has the final say. The more clear-cut the legal question,
the less it will likely benefit from a more fully developed record. Moreover,
clear-cut legal questions do not pose a threat of repetition; once settled, the legal
disposition will control the remainder of the litigation. In assessing an expert’s
qualifications (as in our hypothetical case)174 or a novel claim for relief (as in the
case of Mitchell v. A& K),175 the appellate court will resolve the matter once and
for all (subject to the possibility of Supreme Court review). Whatever conclusion
the jury reaches as to liability (assuming the case returns there for trial
disposition), we would not ordinarily expect the appellate court to revisit legal
conclusions reached in the course of interlocutory review.176

enable them to settle the case without proceeding to trial. When we assume, by contrast, that both
parties reckon the plaintiff’s success at trial at only 50% if the ruling stands and 20% if it is
reversed, the introduction of interlocutory review has a different effect. Under the final judgment
rule there would be a settlement range as plaintiff will accept anything over 28 [(.8 x .5 x 100) –
10 – 2 = 28] and defendant will pay up to 37 [(.5 x .5 x 100) + 10 + 2 = 37]. Immediate review of
the ruling might put the plaintiff in a worse bargaining position. While the settlement range would
go up if the court of appeals upholds the ruling (plaintiff would accept anything over 40 [(.5 x
100) – 10 = 38] and defendant will pay up to 60 [(.5 x 100) + 10 = 60]), it would go down if the
ruling is reversed. The settlement range after a reversal would be between 10 [(.2 x 100) - 10 =
10] and 30 [(.2 x 100) + 10 = 30]. A well advised plaintiff would either reject interlocutory review
in this situation, or consent to interlocutory review only as a part of a pre-appeal settlement to
hedge against the risk of losing the appeal.
174

See supra Part II.B.

175

573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978). See supra Part II.C.2 .

176

To be sure, the Nystrom case illustrates the possibility that appellate court resolution of some
fact-bound questions, such as the claim construction decision on which the parties sought
appellate review, may produce some fragmentation and repetition. That case has made at least
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B. Feigned Case Problems Under Article III
Among the many other limits it imposes on the exercise of judicial power,
Article III forbids the federal courts from hearing feigned or collusive cases.177
As a consequence, the federal courts may not proclaim the law except in cases of
“honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights.”178 The requirement of
adversariness might appear to pose an Article III barrier to our proposal. After
all, we propose to allow the parties to procure an appellate court’s resolution of a
legal question by agreeing with one another that such review would be mutually
beneficial. Some courts might take the view that the parties’ agreement as to the
need for appellate review violates the prohibition against feigned or collusive
cases and thus presents a jurisdictional bar to the exercise of appellate review. In
cases where the parties enter into settlement agreements, conditionally resolving
their dispute subject to the appellate court’s resolution of an outstanding issue,
justiciability issues might appear especially acute.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gator.com v. L.L. Bean illustrates the
concern.179 In a cease-and-desist letter, clothing manufacturer L.L. Bean
three trips to the Federal Circuit already. But these extra trips are likely due to the unavailability
of interlocutory review on the claim construction. The first appeal was dismissed because it
improperly attempted to get interlocutory review of the initial claim construction. Nystrom I, 339
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The second, addressing the claim construction on the merits, reversed
on the construction of one of the claim terms. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136, 1146–48 (Fed. Cir.
2005). While this construction made clear that Nystrom could not win under a theory that TREX
had literally infringed, he still attempted to pursue the case under the theory that TREX had
infringed under the “doctrine of equivalents.” The district court ruled, however, that because
Nystrom’s had stipulated to non-infringement, he had waived his doctrine of equivalents
argument. Nystrom III, 580 F.3d 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This led to the third appeal, where
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the doctrine of equivalents argument
had been waived. Had Nystrom been working under our rule, however, two of these appeals
would have been avoided. First, it would only have taken one trip to the Federal Circuit to get a
definitive ruling on the claim construction. Second, because getting that ruling would not have
required Nystrom stipulating to non-infringement, and there would have been no issue of whether
he had waived his doctrine of equivalents argument.
177

On the feigned case prohibition, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 94-100 (6th ed. 2009); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 50–51 (4th
ed. 2003).
178

United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (quoting Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman,
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
179

398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005).
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demanded that Gator.com stop interfering with Bean’s website by opening pop-up
advertisements for competitor Eddie Bauer.180 In response to Gator’s action for
declaratory relief, Bean moved to dismiss on the ground that the federal district
court in northern California lacked personal jurisdiction over it.181 After the
district court granted the motion, Gator sought review.182 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed, concluding that Bean was subject to both general and specific
jurisdiction in California.183 After en banc review was granted and the case was
fully briefed and argued, the parties informed the court that they had reached a
settlement of the underlying litigation.184 Instead of asking the court to dismiss
the appeal, the parties specifically requested that the court provide a ruling on the
personal jurisdiction issue.185 The settlement provided for a winding down of
Gator’s practices and a payment to compensate Bean; it also provided for Gator to
pay an additional $10,000 if the appellate court found that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Bean.186 The Ninth Circuit found that the settlement
mooted the controversy, and therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.187 The ruling might appear to cast some doubt on the viability of
high/low settlement agreements that turn on the appellate court’s resolution of a
disputed legal issue.188
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Id. at 1127.
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Id. at 1127–28.
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Id.
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Id. at 1134 (W. Fletcher, J. dissenting).
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Id. at 1128 (majority opinion).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1132.
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Subsequent decisions treat the Gator.com dismissal as reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
that the personal jurisdiction issue did not involve the merits of the case but was merely a side
issue. See John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing
Gator.com as a case in which a settlement of the merits of the declaratory judgment action mooted
the case, leaving only the “side issue” of personal jurisdiction). While this gloss helps narrow the
reach of the doctrine, the Gator.com decision nonetheless threatens the viability of contingent
appellate settlement agreements, at least to the extent that the issue the parties wish to press on
appeal can be described as collateral to the merits. Many threshold procedural motions, such as
motions to transfer or dismiss for improper venue or jurisdiction, as well as many dispositive legal
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While the Ninth Circuit decision may appear to draw some support from
recent developments in vacatur practice following a finding of mootness, we do
not believe the analogy holds and we question the mootness conclusion in
Gator.com. Findings of mootness on appeal in the federal system have long given
rise to the practice of remanding the action with a directive that the lower court
vacate its prior judgment.189 Relying on this practice, institutional litigants began
to settle cases on appeal in an effort to moot them and procure the vacatur of an
opinion below that the litigant viewed as antithetical to its institutional interests.
The Court rejected this practice of erasing judgments through settlement, ruling in
United States Bancorp v. Bonner Mall that mootness by way of settlement does
not typically “justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”190 Underlying the
Court’s decision was the perception that parties should not be allowed to purchase
the negation of precedents they dislike through the settlement process.191 To the
extent that the Ninth Circuit regarded Bean as attempting to purchase a favorable
precedent, one can understand the court as having attempted to prevent
gamesmanship comparable to that involved in United States Bancorp.
Ultimately, however, we believe that the settlement practice criticized in
United States Bancorp differs fundamentally from that at issue in Gator.com. To
see the difference, consider the position of the parties at the time they negotiate
their settlements. In the United States Bancorp setting, the parties negotiate a
settlement for the purpose of procuring the vacatur of a decision rendered in the
context of an adversary proceeding. They act, in short, to undo the binding
quality of a judicial decision that they have come to regard as inconvenient. In
the Gator.com setting, by contrast, the parties act not to undo an existing
precedent but to secure the appellate court’s resolution of a disputed issue of law
defenses, such as a limitations defense, might be characterized as a side issue to the merits. As a
result, the Gator.com restriction poses a threat to the effective implementation of agreed-upon
interlocutory review, at least when it occurs in the context of a contingent appellate settlement
agreement.
189

See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).

190

U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). For a critical
evaluation of the practice, anticipating the Supreme Court’s conclusion, see Jill Fisch, Rewriting
History: The Eradication of Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 589 (1991).
191

See United States Bancorp, 340 U.S. at 26 (“Petitioner's voluntary forfeiture of review
constitutes a failure of equity that makes the burden [to show entitlement to the extraordinary
remedy of vacatur] decisive, whatever respondent's share in the mooting of the case might have
been.”).
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about which they have long disagreed. They can argue to the court but they
cannot control the contours of the ultimate decision. The threat underlying the
United States Bancorp decision, that parties might settle their way out from under
the precedential effect of federal decrees, thus seems entirely absent from the
Gator.com setting where the parties continue to press for a binding appellate
resolution that will control both the resolution of their own dispute and provide a
possible precedent for future disputes.
Instead of drawing an analogy to the United States Bancorp setting, we
think that the justiciability issues in Gator.com can be more aptly analogized to
the declaratory judgment action.192 In many declaratory judgment proceedings,
the parties recognize that they have a genuine dispute about a question of law that
will require judicial intervention. For example, an insurance company might
refuse to honor its contractual duty to defend and indemnify after concluding that
its insurance contract has lapsed.193 Both the company and the insured might
recognize the existence of an open question under the terms of the particular
insurance contract. They might further recognize that they cannot resolve the
issue without the intervention of a neutral decision maker. They might agree to
arbitrate their dispute or to initiate a declaratory judgment action to clarify the
contract’s applicability.194 Both parties might recognize the need for judicial
intervention, and might agree to secure it, but that joint interest in settlement of
the dispute would not make the case a feigned proceeding. So long as they
genuinely contest the contractual issue, and have adequate incentives to do so,

192

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act allows the federal courts to issue declaratory judgments
in cases of “actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. At one time, the federal courts appeared
reluctant to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings as a result of concerns with their
justiciability under Article III. For an account, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 177, at 56. But the
Court promptly upheld the act’s constitutionality as applied to a fairly concrete dispute over the
interpretation of an insurance contract. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
193

See 14 STEVEN PLITT, JOSHUA D ROGERS, DANIEL MALDONADO, LEE R RUSS & THOMAS F
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 202:3 (3d ed. 1997) (“In case of doubt or dispute as to whether
there is a duty to defend, based on dispute over whether an insurance policy affords coverage for
the conduct alleged in the complaint against the insured, a declaratory judgment action or motion
may be brought to make the determination.”); cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green
Professional Associates, PLC, 495 F.3d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2007) (declaratory judgment action by
general liability insurance provider against out-patient drug treatment facility contesting duty to
defend claim by estates of patient and another third-party who perished in car accident caused by
patient after he left treatment center after receiving methadone treatment).
194

See Travelers, 495 F.3d at 268.
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their agreement as to the need for a legal resolution should not bar the federal
courts from intervening.195
Parties who agree on the need for appellate review occupy much the same
position toward one another as litigants who agree on the need for a declaratory
judgment proceeding. That is, the parties continue to dispute the issue of law they
wish to present to the appellate court, but agree on the need for its resolution. Our
proposal would, in effect, authorize the parties to seek a declaratory judgment
from the appellate court upon agreement that the appellate resolution would
advance the resolution of their dispute. So long as the parties have an adequate
financial incentive to pursue their opposing views of the issue on appeal,
continued litigation at the appellate court level does not appear to threaten the
requirement of adversary presentation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has twice
upheld the justiciability of disputes in the wake of the parties’ adoption of
contingent appellate settlement agreements.196 The entry into such settlements
did not moot the cases on appeal, in the Court’s view, because the amount of
money changing hands between the parties was structured to turn on the Court’s
resolution of a disputed legal question.197 District courts, under our proposal,
would have authority to evaluate the terms of any contingent appellate settlement
agreement and satisfy themselves as to the existence of that degree of adversity
195

Cf. id. at 271 (although neither party raised jurisdictional issues, the court raised the issue sua
sponte and found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action was an
abuse of discretion). While the court found that the resolution of this declaratory judgment action
would not settle the controversy or help to clarify the legal relationships between the parties, this
may be a dubious determination. See id. Once the insurance provider clarified its duty to defend
the insured, it could then enter into settlement negotiations with the third-party estates. Until it
was clear, however, that the insurance company had any duty to defend, those settlement
negotiations would be impossible.
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See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (confirming justiciability of immunity issue on
appeal, notwithstanding settlement agreement under which Nixon would pay $142,000 if
absolutely immune from suit and $170,000 if only qualifiedly immune); Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (upholding the justiciability of a class action appeal, despite a
settlement agreement that provided that the plaintiffs would receive either $400 apiece, or nothing
at all, depending on the outcome of the appeal).
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In Nixon, the former President paid Fitzgerald $142,000, in exchange for which, Fitzgerald
agreed to accept liquidated damages of another $28,000 if the Supreme Court found that President
Nixon was not entitled to absolute immunity. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743–44. The Court found
that both parties still had “a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented
in [the] Court” and therefore the case was not moot. Id. at 744. Similarly, in Havens, the Court
found that an agreement liquidating damages in case of success on appeal did not moot the claims.
See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 371.
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needed for further litigation under Article III. Appellate courts could also inquire
into the situation if doubts arose as to the existence of adversity sufficient to
sustain their appellate jurisdiction.
C. The Incidence Problem
We expect that uncertainty about the incidence of agreed-upon
interlocutory review will lead to questions about our proposal. (By incidence, we
mean to refer to the frequency with which the parties and district courts will
approve interlocutory appellate review.) Without concrete data on the expected
incidence of party-driven review, we can offer only our best guess that our
proposal will do more good than harm. Some might point to the lack of incidence
data in arguing that party-agreements will inundate the appellate courts with a
new collection of appeals, perhaps on mundane or routine questions, and will
siphon away scarce appellate resources from more pressing matters. Others might
use the lack of incidence data to express the opposite concern: that the parties
will all too rarely agree to appellate review, thus making the proposal more of an
academic exercise than a practical tool for the resolution of disputes. We
acknowledge the concern; one of the reasons we labeled this Article a preliminary
analysis was to capture a measure of our own uncertainty and to invite more
scholarship.
We can nonetheless offer some (preliminary) comments on the incidence
problem, focusing first on the threat to appellate dockets. Both our model and our
assessment of such interlocutory appeals as that in Nystrom give us some
confidence that the parties will not burden the appellate courts with a flood of
appeals on matters that would otherwise work themselves out at the trial stage of
the process. Economic interests will tend to encourage the parties to agree on
interlocutory review of those dispositive legal issues that they expect to survive
(and potentially threaten) the lower court’s resolution of liability issues in the
case. Precisely because the parties anticipate that those dispositive issues will
survive for appellate adjudication, they will occasionally have incentives to get
them addressed sooner rather than later. As a consequence, we would expect
substantial overlap between the issues that the parties identify for interlocutory
review and those that they view as likely candidates for review in the wake of a
final judgment.198 It thus seems likely that our proposal will not alter the mix of
issues brought to the appellate courts so much as the timing of appellate court
review. In Nystrom, we observe, the appellate court agreed to make interlocutory
198

As discussed above, in high-stakes litigation, the likelihood of appeal is great, and therefore the
question is not about whether to appeal, but when. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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review available of claim construction issues that were likely to have survived any
disposition of the case at the trial level.199
If we can rely on the parties’ self-interest to identify serious issues for
interlocutory appellate review that are likely to require appellate resolution in any
case, can we also predict that they will agree with sufficient frequency to justify
the adoption of a new rule? Here, we point first to the fact of increasing
judicialization, a trend that suggests that the number of dispositive legal issues
will continue to grow and produce greater need for interlocutory review. We also
observe that the relative costs of trial and appellate litigation tend to create
conditions favorable to growing demand for interlocutory review. At the trial
level, the growing cost of e-discovery, increased reliance on expert witnesses, and
other factors have tended to drive up the cost of obtaining a jury’s resolution on
liability.200 At the appellate level, by contrast, the trend runs in the opposite
direction; such technological innovations as computerized legal research and
word processing have reduced the relative cost of appellate practice over the past
generation.201 Not surprisingly, then, we find a strong demand for interlocutory
review in precisely those fields of litigation that are characterized by relatively
high trial practice costs and relatively inexpensive appellate review. Patent
holders and other intellectual property litigants, in particular, have pressed
199

If there are many claims at issue, and even one construction appears to disfavor the eventual
loser at trial, an appeal seems likely. As seen anecdotally, through the case of Fuesting III, 2010
WL 271728 (7th Cir. 2010), similar issues may arise in the area of qualification of expert
testimony. See supra notes 157170 and accompanying text.
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On e-discovery, see John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew the Justice System,
Gartner RAS Core Research Note G00148170, at 2 (Apr. 20, 2007) (Justice Breyer noting that the
large cost of e-discovery could “limit use of courts to only those who have the tools and money”
and “drive out of the litigation system a lot of people who ought to be there.”), available at
www.h5technologies.com/pdf/gartner0607.pdf. On expert witness fees, see Anthony v. Abbott
Laboratories, 106 F.RD. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) (“Our citizens' access to justice, which is at the
core of our constitutional system of government, is under serious siege. Obtaining justice in this
modern era costs too much. The courts are among our most treasured institutions. And, if they are
to remain strong and viable, they cannot sit idly by in the face of attempts to loot the system. To
be sure, expert witness fees are but the tip of an immense iceberg. But, the skyrocketing costs of
litigation have not sprung full-blown from nowhere. Those costs are made up of bits and pieces,
and relaxation of standards of fairness in one instance threatens further escalation across the board.
The effective administration of justice depends, in significant part, on the maintenance and
enforcement of a reasoned cost/benefit vigil by the judiciary.”).
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See Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might
Do To Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321, 1322–26 (1994) (noting the impact of
technology on reducing costs to the courts of appeals and to litigants themselves).
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Congress in recent years for legislation that would ease their access to the
appellate courts for interlocutory review of dispositive legal issues.202
In addition, some decisions, such as claim construction and the admission
of expert testimony may be the subject of cross-motions. The resulting decisions
may leave both sides unhappy about some portion of the ruling. In such cases, the
parties might agree to interlocutory review if both believe the result will both
provide clarity and strengthen their position. Finally, even in situations where one
party clearly prevails on a particular ruling, the losing party might be willing to
put enough money on the settlement table to convince the winner to agree to
interlocutory review. For example, consider a defendant that loses a motion for
summary judgment. The defendant would like to immediately appeal this
decision, and will likely not settle without such an appeal. But the plaintiff would
likely not agree to interlocutory review, having just won at an important stage of
the litigation. The defendant could, however, offer to settle, with the full amount
of the settlement being determined by the result of the interlocutory appeal.203
We recognize that the greater the likely incidence of agreed-upon review,
the more likely appellate courts will oppose our proposal. As a general matter,
appellate courts have experienced greater growth in their dockets in recent years
than have the district courts.204 To cope, appellate courts have adopted a variety
of measures: they have increased their reliance on per curiam dispositions,205
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See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 10(b) (2009) (allowing interlocutory
appeals of claim construction rulings); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8(b)
(2009) (allowing interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings “if the district court finds that
there is a sufficient evidentiary record and an immediate appeal from the order (A) may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, or (B) will likely control the outcome of the
case, unless such certification is clearly erroneous.”).
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Parties to such agreements may seek review by joint motion for interlocutory review under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). See, e.g., John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir.
2009). As discussed previously, however, the appellate court has the discretion to refuse to take
such appeals. See supra note 14.
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See POSNER, supra note 75, 100–01, Table 4.2 (cases filed in district courts grew 372%
between 1960 and 1983, while cases filed in courts of appeals grew 823%; cases filed in district
courts dropped 1% between 1983 and 1995, while cases filed in courts of appeals grew 67%).
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The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2009, 64.1% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unsigned. Judicial
Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-3.

58

Pfander & Pekarek Krohn

granted fewer oral arguments,206 released fewer opinions for publication as fully
precedential,207 and made greater efforts to resolve matters through alternative
dispute resolution.208 The perception that appellate courts have experienced
greater docket growth in recent years surely helps to explain their reluctance to
accept certified questions for interlocutory review under section 1292(b).209 We
can predict that our proposal, in omitting any provision for the appellate court to
screen appeals, will prove somewhat controversial among appellate judges.
Yet we worry that the introduction of a screening mechanism would
undermine a central purpose of our proposal. As we explained at the outset, our
proposal to rely on the parties to identify issues for interlocutory appellate review
offers the advantages of both categorical and discretionary review. Categorical
review avoids the necessity for appellate screening, a practice that can often
consume scarce appellate resources without producing any decision on the merits
of a divisive legal issue.210 Discretionary review tends to target issues that
deserve appellate attention, but imposes a screening burden on either the trial or
appellate court.211 By relying on the parties to identify issues deserving of
interlocutory review and the district court to ensure that systemic interests receive
due attention, our proposal offers some of the advantages of both approaches.212
Introduction of a layer of appellate screening would complicate the process of
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The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2009, 71.5% of cases were terminated on the merits without oral argument.
Judicial Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-1. This is
compared with 59.9% of cases for the same period in 1997. Judicial Business of the United
States, 1997 Annual Report of the Director, table S-1. See also POSNER, supra note 75, at 161–62
(discussing “the curtailment of both the length and frequency of oral argument.”).
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The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2009, 83.2% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unpublished.
Judicial Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director, table S-3. See also
POSNER, supra note 75, at 162–75; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373–74 (1995) (noting that many
unpublished decisions “would have been the subject of full-fledged opinions a few decades ago.”).
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See supra note 59.
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See supra note 14.
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See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text.
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docketing an appeal and raise the cost of appellate review to the parties by
requiring them to brief both the discretionary issue and the merits. It would,
moreover, enable the appellate courts to narrow access to their dockets, thus
duplicating the disappointing results that have obtained under section 1292(b)’s
provision for certified review.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Apart from the relaxation of the final judgment rule, much has changed
since the nineteenth century, and much was foreseen by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes. While Holmes denied that “general principles” can decide “concrete
cases,”213 he also observed that judges work by induction reasoning from the
bottom up. By this, Holmes meant that judges draw their general principles from
the consensus reflected in prior decisions.214 Holmes thus described a process of
generalization that bears some resemblance to what we observe today as courts
and legislatures insistently go about the business of transforming issues of fact
into matters of law. With this modern shift towards judicialization, we observe an
accompanying demand for judicial dispositions; juries can no longer provide a
decisive answer to many of the questions that divide litigating parties.
With the rise of general principles, the growing cost of trial practice, and
the preference for settlement in the shadow of the law, parties increasingly
demand access to appellate review at all stages of the litigation process. We can
see this growing demand reflected in the many tools of interlocutory review that
courts and rule makers have already made available to the parties. These tools
represent a significant departure from the nineteenth century’s final judgment
rule, which rather inflexibly barred any pre-judgment appellate oversight of
actions for money damages. Rather than a world of inflexible finality, we now
inhabit a world of presumptive but episodic finality, where arguments for
exceptions to the final judgment rule receive respectful attention.
213
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

In perhaps his best known aphorism, Holmes proclaimed that “experience,” not logic, was the
life of the law. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1879). In
rejecting deductive logic, Holmes was arguing for induction, or bottom up reasoning, as the key to
the development of general principles. He found merit in the common law because “it decides the
case first, and determines the principle afterward.” Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (quoting O.W. Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 725 (1931)). For all his skepticism about logic, Holmes remained quite keen on the
importance of identifying general principles; he simply rejected the syllogism as the basis for their
derivation.

60

Pfander & Pekarek Krohn

In this Article, we have argued that the parties should be given a measure
of control over their own access to interlocutory review. Parties will, needless to
say, refuse to agree on such review in the great majority of cases; plaintiffs will
likely reject interlocutory appeals that they regard as more likely to delay than to
edify. But in cases where a question of law strikes the parties as one that could go
either way, when the question of law can invalidate or reconfigure much of what
lies ahead in the trial court, and when the cost of appellate review seems modest
in relation to the cost of preparing the case for submission to the jury, parties will
have good reason to seek an early appellate court answer to the question. We
have argued that, for systemic reasons, such questions will almost always warrant
interlocutory review. We thus suggest a rule that would authorize a district court
to certify an issue for interlocutory review upon agreement of the parties.

